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ABSTRACT
Essays in Informal Risk Sharing
by
Prachi Jain
Chair: Manuela Angelucci and Jeffrey A. Smith
Poor households are especially vulnerable to severe income fluctuations such as
weather and health shocks. Coping with these shocks is especially costly in de-
veloping countries, since households often lack access to formal insurance and
credit markets. These households frequently cope with income fluctuations using
transfers and gifts from other households. This dissertation examines the mecha-
nisms underlying this informal risk sharing. Poor households are relatively well
insured against idiosyncratic risk despite the prevalence of information and en-
forcement problems. Social connections may help to sustain cooperation between
households and improve risk sharing. Using a laboratory experiment implemented
with residents of a slum in Kenya, the first dissertation chapter examines whether
social ties affect informal risk sharing when there is imperfect monitoring of ef-
fort. In addition to risk sharing motives, transfers between poor households in
developing countries may occur for a variety of other motives. My second chapter
compares the relative importance of social preferences, specifically altruism and
inequality aversion, social proximity, bargaining weights, and risk preferences on
sharing in an experiment with risk sharing games. My third chapter examines
how well households in rural Mexico smooth consumption against idiosyncratic
income shocks, specifically illnesses, natural disasters, and cash transfers from a
ix
government program. The results speak to whether the efficiency of social in-
surance and poverty alleviation programs could be improved if policymakers take




Imperfect Monitoring and Informal Risk
Sharing: The Role of Social Ties
This paper examines whether social ties impact informal risk sharing when there is im-
perfect monitoring of effort. I conduct a laboratory experiment with residents of slums in
Kenya in which I vary the observability of effort. I find that individuals are 7% less likely
to risk share as a result of imperfect monitoring of effort. However, I find that socially close
individuals engage in substantially more risk sharing than socially distant pairs. Specifi-
cally, participants who know their partner outside the experiment are 31% more likely to




Poor households in developing countries are vulnerable to income shocks such as weather,
illness, and unexpected expenses. Despite this, there is considerable evidence that poor
households are relatively well insured against risk (Townsend, 1994; Townsend, 1995;
Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006). They accomplish this through
informal risk sharing arrangements between households that allow them to cope with in-
come fluctuations through transfers and gifts (Platteau and Abraham, 1987; Udry, 1994),
even though inter-household arrangements are characterized by imperfect monitoring, im-
perfect information and lack of contract enforcement. Social connections may sustain
nearly perfect risk sharing by serving as social collateral (Ambrus et al., 2014; Karlan et
al., 2009; Attanasio et al., 2012), increasing altruism (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Leider
et al., 2009; Ligon and Schechter, 2012; Fafchamps, 2011), generating intrinsic motives to
work (Attanasio et al., 2012; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003) or providing better information
(De Weerdt et al., 2014). When effort cannot be observed, informal insurance may be
limited (Kinnan, 2014; Rogerson, 1985; Phelan, 1998; Belhaj et al., 2014). However, the
extent to which social ties maintain risk sharing when individuals may shirk remains an
open question.
This paper examines whether social ties can sustain risk sharing even when effort cannot
be observed. To address this question, I use a novel laboratory experiment designed to
estimate the effects of imperfect monitoring on risk sharing. Implementing the experiment
in Kenya, I find that although imperfect monitoring limits risk sharing by 7% overall, it has
no impact for socially connected individuals. As a result, socially connected individuals
are 31% more likely to engage in risk sharing than individuals who do not know each other
when effort cannot be observed.
The experiment is conducted with residents of a large slum, a population facing low
and variable income and familiar with informal insurance, which provides an appropriate
context for the experiment. In the experiment, I vary whether effort can be observed in risk
sharing games to causally identify how imperfect monitoring affects risk sharing. In each
game of a series of risk sharing games, participants receive either a high or low income.
Each participant’s probability of high income depends on whether the participant completes
a real-effort task. In the game, participants first negotiate a binding insurance agreement
with their partner and then attempt the task. Transfers between participants can depend
on income and, when effort can be observed, task completion. Since participants play all
risk sharing games and partners are randomized between games, I can examine the effect
of social proximity on risk sharing while controlling for individual characteristics such as
2
altruism and risk preferences.
To test risk sharing, I first formulate a model of effort choice and risk sharing. In the
model, effort increases the likelihood of high income, yet risk sharing may create an incen-
tive for participants to shirk. Social connections provide an increasing work incentive and
decrease bargaining costs, which determines whether participants engage in risk sharing.
The experiment generated several results. First, does risk sharing decrease as a result
of imperfect monitoring? This model predicts that imperfect monitoring should decrease
both the level and likelihood of risk sharing. Empirically, I find that participants are 7%
less likely to engage in risk sharing when effort cannot be observed but that the level of risk
sharing, conditional on any sharing, is not affected.
Second, do social ties have an effect on risk sharing? The model predicts that social
connections should not have an effect on the level of risk sharing when effort is observable.
The model also predicts that participants who are socially connected should be more likely
to engage in risk sharing than participants who are not socially connected. Consistent with
the prediction, I find no effect of social ties on the level of risk sharing. I find no statistically
significant effect of social ties on likelihood of risk sharing when effort can be observed;
thus, I can reject the hypothesis that social connections correspond to altruism or decreased
bargaining costs.
Conversely, the model predicts that social connections will have a positive effect on the
level of risk sharing and an additional effect on the likelihood of risk sharing when effort
is unobservable. Since risk sharing cannot depend on effort, participants who shirk still
receive the benefits of risk sharing. Social ties should have an effect by increasing work
incentives.
I find that social connections have an effect on both the level and likelihood of risk
sharing when effort cannot be observed. Specifically, I find that individuals with social ties
are 31% more likely to engage in risk sharing than individuals without social ties. I further
find that this effect depends on the strength of the social connection. Participants with a
stronger connection to their partner are 47% more likely to engage in risk sharing, 53%
more likely to transfer money, and 25% more likely to complete the task than participants
without strong ties. Overall I find that there is no effect of imperfect monitoring, either on
the level or likelihood of risk sharing, for socially connected individuals.
To gain more insight into my results, I explore whether social connections have an effect
due to altruism, better information, or by increasing incentives to work and cooperate when
effort cannot be observed. Since social ties do not have an overall effect on risk sharing,
but do have an effect when effort is unobservable, I can rule out that altruism increases
cooperation overall in the experiment. In addition, I do not find evidence that socially
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connected individuals have better information about their partner. I find that participants
who are socially connected are more likely to believe that their partner completed the task
and more likely to complete the task when effort cannot be observed. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that social connections generate incentives to work due to the repeated
nature of social connections or intrinsic motives generated by social connections.
There are both drawbacks and advantages to the experimental approach. A concern
with all experimental work is that subjects behave differently in non-laboratory settings.
For example, my laboratory experiment omits real world features such as lack of contract
enforcement and the repeated nature of social interactions. The advantage is that these
features allow me to disentangle the effects of imperfect monitoring from other information
and enforcement problems that govern risk sharing outside of the laboratory.12 In addition,
I can control for individual characteristics since risk sharing groups in the experiment are
exogenously formed (as in Leider et al., 2009 and Ligon and Schechter, 2012).3 However,
the disadvantage is that these features limit the generalizability of this paper to risk sharing
outside of the laboratory. Thus, the results from this paper should direct future research on
the role of social ties on risk sharing when monitoring is imperfect.
In addition to its contribution to the economic literature, this paper has implications
for policymakers who aim to minimize the unintended spillovers of public insurance to
private insurance for poor households. My findings suggest that the strength of ties within
a community determines the extent to which households engage in risk sharing and can thus
cope with income shocks when effort cannot be observed. Given that risk sharing occurs
in the presence of information asymmetries, policymakers interested in aiding households
vulnerable to risk should focus on those communities with weak social ties.
1While a number of studies have focused on testing models of incomplete insurance against each other
(Kinnan, 2014; Karaivanov and Townsend, 2014; Attanasio and Pavoni, 2011; Lim and Townsend, 1998;
Ligon, 1998), to the best of my knowledge there is no study that estimates the effects of imperfect monitoring
on risk sharing.
2 Charness and Genicot (2009), Chandrasekhar et al. (2011 and 2015), Barr and Genicot (2008), and
Barr et al. (2012) use of laboratory experiments to study risk sharing, generally in the context of limited
commitment.
3In contrast, the non-experimental literature on risk sharing focuses on endogenously formed groups
(Angelucci et al., 2012; Attanasio et al., 2012; Karlan et al., 2009; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009; Fafchamps
and Gubert, 2007; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; De Weerdt, 2004; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Grimmard,
1997).
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1.2 Experiment Design and Context
1.2.1 Experiment Design
The experiment was conducted March-June 2015 at the Busara Center for Behavioral Eco-
nomics in Nairobi, Kenya. The experiment consists of 25 sessions lasting approximately
3 hours with 426 participants.4 During each session, participants play a partner game on
a touch-screen computer, conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions are pro-
vided orally by trained full-time laboratory assistants who read from a script in both English
and Swahili, as well as written in English. Computers are separated by panels, allowing for
anonymity. In order to ensure comprehension, participant knowledge is verified through
periodic quizzes during the session.
All participants play a series of risk sharing games with partners. The Risk Only game
includes only risky income, the Observable Effort game includes risk and observable com-
pletion of a real-effort task, and the Unobservable Effort Game includes risk and unobserv-
able completion of a real-effort task. Participants are randomly rematched with partners
between games. This randomization allows me to examine the role of social connections
while controlling for individual characteristics such as altruism and risk aversion. The or-
der of the risk sharing games is randomized across sessions and participants are paid for
the decisions made in one of the three games. Given that there is risky income and a single
game is randomly chosen for payment, risk averse participants should attempt to smooth
consumption to decrease the variability of a one-shot lottery payment.
The average payout is greater than the average daily wage in the slum.5 There are two
payment schemes used. I vary the stakes to ensure that the results are robust over increasing
financial stakes. In payment scheme 1, 258 participants begin with an endowment of 350
Kenyan shillings (KSH, approximately $3.49 USD).6 If participants receive a high income
shock (H), they gain 100 KSH and if they receive a low income shock (L), they lose 100
KSH. In payment scheme 2, 168 participants begin with an endowment of 250 KSH. If they
receive a high income shock, they gain 400 KSH and if they receive a low income shock
then they do not receive any additional money, 0 KSH. A post-experiment phone survey
4A detailed summary of the sessions is provided in Appendix Table C.1.
5Potential subjects are invited via SMS text message. Participants are compensated with 200 KSH in cash
(with an additional 50 KSH for arriving to the session on time) to allay transportation and opportunity costs
they may incur in attending the session. Those that are turned away from the session due to limitations on
capacity are paid the cash show-up fee. Four participants were removed during the sessions; their data is
dropped from all results shown.
6Busara requires that participants receive at least 300 KSH (daily wage in the slum is 350 KSH as esti-
mated by Haushofer et al., 2014) and so the endowment was set to satisfy that restriction.
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indicates that 82% of participants are risk averse over these stakes.7
Next I briefly discuss each risk sharing game.8 In the Risk Only game, each participant
faces a 75% chance of receiving a high income shock (H) and a 25% chance of receiving a
low income shock (L). Income is independently distributed and observable. Before income
is determined, each participant communicates face-to-face with her partner to negotiate a
contract that specifies what transfers she is willing to give or receive. The contract speci-
fies the promise for each possible combination of incomes realizations (the set of possible
income realizations are {H,H}, {H,L}, {L,H}, {L,L} where the first entry denotes the
income of the participant and the second entry denotes of the income of her partner).910 If
participants do not agree on a contract, no transfers are made.11 Then income is determined
and transfers are made based on the transfers promised. Realized income and transfers are
not announced until the end of the session, after all games have been played and participants
have completed the survey. The purpose of the Risk Only game is to provide a benchmark
with existing studies (Chandrasekhar et al., 2015; Fischer, 2013; Attanasio et al., 2012).
In the games with effort, income realizations depend on whether the participant com-
pletes a counting zeros task.12 To complete the task, participants must correctly count the
total number of zeros contained in 45 grids, which are composed of zeros and ones. An
image of the task is provided in Figure 1.1.13 When the task is first introduced, participants
have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the task in a two-minute practice round
7I give participants the same stakes as in the experiment (either 450 or 650 KSH) and ask them to choose
how to divide the money between two envelopes, where one will be randomly chosen for payment. Partic-
ipants are classified as risk averse if they choose to divide the money equally between two envelopes (40%
participants). Allowing for arithmetic errors, 82% of participants split the money almost equally between the
two envelopes.
8Detailed game scripts are available in Appendix A. I additionally provide examples of contracts to aid
with comprehension in the payment scheme 2 script.
9Participants cannot both give and receive a transfer in the same combination of income realizations. Note
that I put no restrictions on either the direction or symmetry of the promised transfers in the contracts.
10Participants are given worksheets to aid them as they negotiate the contract with their partner. A copy of
these worksheets can be found in Appendix B for payment scheme 1. Worksheet 1 is for the Risk Only and
Unobservable Effort games, while Worksheet 2 is for the Observable Effort game.
11Participants are given unlimited time to discuss the contracts. In the Risk Only game (Observable Effort
game/Unobservable Effort Game), participants take on average 7.7 (19.4/9.4) minutes to negotiate a contract.
Then participants are asked if they agreed on a contract with their partner on the computer. In practice,
over 95% of participants reach an agreement on a contract, including contracts in which they specify no
transfers promised. If both participants agree, then they enter the contracts into the computer. If the contracts
entered do not match their partner’s entry (i.e. if a participant enters “I give 100 KSH”, her partner must
enter “I receive 100 KSH”), then the program provides an additional opportunity to enter the contract. The
requirement that the contracts entered must match is to prevent manipulation. If contracts still do not match,
then no transfers are made. This is known to participants in advance and occurs for 4.2% (13.5%/2.8%) of
partnerships in the Risk Only game (Observable Effort game/Unobservable Effort game).
12I use effort interchangeably with completion of the task throughout this paper.
13Note that participants are updated during the task with the number of grids they have answered correctly.
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in which they are paid 2 KSH for each correct answer. I use this task because it minimizes
the importance of education or ability, as there are never more than fifteen zeros in a single
grid, and is tedious (Abeler et al., 2011). Since the task is implemented over the computer,
effort cannot be observed by others. At any time, a participant can choose to end the task
and instead watch a video with headphones provided for leisure. The task and leisure ac-
tivity are chosen to limit the degree to which participants find the task satisfying and to rule
out the possibility that participants complete the task to please the experimenter.
If the participant completes the task, she then faces a 75% probability of receiving H
and a 25% probability of receiving L; if she does not complete the task, then she faces a
25% probability of receivingH and a 75% probability of receivingL. Participants negotiate
their contract of transfers before attempting to complete the counting task.
In the Observable Effort game, a participant can observe whether her partner has com-
pleted the task. Furthermore, the contract can condition transfers on task completion
(E = complete the task, N = do not complete the task) in addition to the set of possi-
ble income realizations. This results in 16 choices: ({H,H}, {H,L}, {L,H}, {L,L}) x
({E,E}, {E,N}, {N,E}, {N,N}). 14
Finally, in the Unobservable Effort Game, since the contract specifying transfers cannot
condition on effort, it conditions on the income realizations. Thus, the difference in behav-
ior between the Observable Effort and Unobservable Effort games captures the effects of
imperfect monitoring.
After the risk sharing games are played, all participants answer survey questions about
themselves, their partner, informal transfers made outside of the laboratory and their val-
ues. In addition, they receive a phone survey in July-August 2015. Participants receive
additional income for choices made in the surveys.15
All participants are paid within two days of the experiment via M-PESA, a mobile-
phone based money transfer service. The average payment is 490 KSH (approximately
$4.90 USD) with a standard deviation of 153 KSH (minimum of 179 KSH and maximum
of 840 KSH), in addition to the show-up fee. The self-reported daily wage is around 350
KSH (based on data from 2011, Haushofer et al., 2014). Since I implement the outcome
from a randomly chosen game for payment and payment is sent through M-PESA, it is
unlikely that participants use transfers after the experiment to risk share.
14Essentially, the difference in behavior between the Risk Only and Observable Effort games is the result
of a change in how income is earned. Given evidence that social norms differ regarding the sharing of earned
and unearned income (Jakiela, 2015; List, 2007; Rey-Biel et al., 2015), there may be different levels of risk
sharing in the Risk Only and Observable Effort games. Although this is interesting, it is beyond the scope of
the paper.
15Participants are paid for a choice in an anonymous dictator game, for a choice between two lotteries and
for answering a randomly-selected question about their partner correctly.
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1.2.2 Context
To conduct my experiment, I select my participants from Kibera, one of the largest informal
settlements (slums) in Africa. Kibera is situated 5 kilometers from the Nairobi city center
and 2 kilometers from the experimental site. In Kibera, 42% of households fall below the
poverty line of $2 a day (Marx et al., 2015). Estimates of the population in Kibera range
from 170,000 (2009 official census) to over 1 million (unofficial sources). The settlement
is divided into 9 smaller villages. To examine the effects of social ties, I issue invitations
for each session by village and ethnic group within Kibera (data from laboratory records),
resulting in natural variation in social proximity in my experiment. Since households have
lived 16 years on average in Kibera (Marx et al., 2015), there are likely to be both strong
and weak social ties between participants in my experiment.
To participate in the experiment, participants must be at least 18 years and have access
to a cell phone and M-PESA.16 The summary statistics of participants in Table 1.1 show
that participants are somewhat comparable to the typical resident of Kibera. Since partic-
ipants must be available to attend the experiment during the workweek, my participants
are more likely to be female. Given that Marx et al. (2015) find that residents of Kibera
are more likely to have some secondary education (42%) and are more likely to be Luo,
Luhya or Kamba (35%, 27%, 15% respectively) than the rest of Kenya, my participants are
comparable to residents of Kibera in both education and ethnic makeup.
The average participant in my experiment has been involved in 1.98 other studies since
2012, when Busara was founded. All participants for payment scheme 2 were newly re-
cruited. This should allay concerns that participants of my experiment are familiar with
economic experiments.
The survey responses show that 65% of participants perceive their household income
in the past year to be well below or below average. Furthermore, 29% of participants
report that they primarily work for themselves, 32% report that cannot find work, and
44% of participants report that they primarily work once in a while. In addition, 86% of
participants indicate they have faced a household shock in the past 6 months, with 59%
reporting multiple shocks.17 Finally, participants use informal transfers. 30% (51%) of
participants indicate they have received (given) on average 2428 (2371) KSH in the past
month. This should inform the interpretation of my results, since this is a population that
16Recent data collected in the Nairobi slums suggest that over 90% of residents have access to both a cell
phone and M-PESA (Marx et al., 2015). A detailed description of recruitment into the Busara subject pool is
provided in Haushofer et al. (2014).
17These household shocks include weather related shocks, wedding or funeral expenses, eviction, loss of
job or decrease in work available, or illness that prevented a household member from working or required
medical expenses.
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uses informal transfers and face risk in their regular lives; thus, I select this population for
my study since they likely bring their norms governing risk sharing into the laboratory.
We may be concerned that participants are unfamiliar with features of the games, given
the enforceable ex ante contracts and the one shot nature of the interaction.18 My partic-
ipants frequently engage in institutions with well-defined rules and regulations, such as
Rotating Savings and Credits Associations (59% use ROSCAs or Merry-Go-Rounds) and
group-based funeral insurance (which is common in East Africa as demonstrated in De
Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; Dercon et al., 2006). Thus, participants are familiar with in-
formal financial promises. Also, since 77% of participants indicate they have discussed
with family and friends what they might do if a bad shock were to occur, they are used to
thinking ahead financially.
1.3 Model of Effort Choice and Risk Sharing
In this section I develop my static model of risk sharing and effort choice that generates
testable predictions.19 In the model, risk sharing generates an incentive for participants to
shirk when effort cannot be observed. However, individuals also face an incentive to work
for the high probability of a high income shock. Thus, the effect of imperfect monitoring
of effort on risk sharing will depend on the strength of the counteracting incentives. When
risk sharing is limited, social ties may encourage risk sharing by providing an additional
incentive for participants to work and cooperate.
Suppose that there are two risk-averse agents, i ∈ {A,B}. These agents are endowed
with initial wealth ω and face income shocks, pi ∈ {H,L} where H > L. In addition,
they can exert costly effort, which increases the probability of the high income shock. For
simplicity, I consider only two effort levels, no effort e = N or effort e = E, respectively




come from the experiment). No effort is costless, while the cost of providing effort, c, is
positive.20
18In addition, participants understand incentives similar to those presented in the experiment. I find that
51% of participants report that they had participated in more sessions than the laboratory records them as
having attended (this difference is significant at the 1% level) when I provide financial incentives to over-
report. I also find that participants are 50% more likely to report that everybody or most people would work
when they are partially insured versus fully insured (this difference is significant at the 1% level).
19Empirical tests of theories of moral hazard in risk sharing (Kinnan, 2014; Rogerson, 1985; Phelan, 1998)
rely on an inverse Euler equation implication, i.e. the way that history matters in forecasting consumption.
Since the risk sharing games in my experiment are one-shot games, these tests cannot be applied. However,
the broad implication that risk sharing may decrease with imperfect monitoring can be derived from both
previous theories and the model I present here.
20This implicitly assumes that the cost of effort is homogenous across agents. I relax this assumption in
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In this model, agents are characterized by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function,
which is assumed to be continuous, with a continuous derivative, strictly increasing and
concave in wealth. Utility is separable in income and effort and income is independently
distributed. Agents bargain to reach a contract of promised transfers that depend on income
and, in the Observable Effort game, effort.
I model the problem as a benevolent principal with an ex ante utilitarian criterion and
equal weights placed on each agent (as in Belhaj et al., 2014). Equivalently, the solution
can be interpreted as a Nash bargaining outcome with equal outside option and bargaining
power. Agents can choose no transfers promised and revert to autarky, where I assume it is
optimal to exert effort. In the second stage of the model, agents individually choose whether
to exert effort. Since bargaining power is equal, there are no transfers promised when both
agents receive the same income and contracts are thus symmetric, i.e. τAB = τBA = τ .
In the model, socially connected agents face an additional incentive to work. Socially
connected individuals are engaged in a repeated game with their partner outside of the ex-
periment. The repeated nature of the game means that a socially connected agent may fear
punishment or loss of the relationship if her partner suspects she shirks in the experiment
(Karlan et al., 2009; Ambrus et al., 2014). Equivalently, socially connected individuals
may be more intrinsically motivated to work, due to altruism towards their partner (Foster
and Rosenzweig, 2001; Leider et al., 2009; Ligon and Schechter, 2012) or guilt (Attanasio
et al., 2012). In the model, this utility loss, di (rAB) ≥ 0, arises if an agent chooses to
shirk and depends on the relationship, rAB, between the agent and her partner. Agents with
a social connection to their partner (rAB = 1) suffer a greater loss in utility than those
without a social connection (rAB = 0) if they shirk, i.e. di (rAB = 1) > di (rAB = 0).
Although social connections are modeled as a binary variable in the model, whether or not
agents have a relationship, the implications from the theory hold if the utility depends on
relationship strength.
With a contract with any transfers promised, agents may incur a bargaining cost, bAB
(similar to the association costs proposed in Murgai et al., 2002). As a result, some agents
may choose autarky.21 The bargaining cost, which is heterogenous across partnerships and
known to agents, relates to exogenous factors such as whether a common dialect is spo-
ken, the relationship between the agent and her partner, and the mental cost associated with
reaching a contract. The bargaining cost is lower for agents who share a social connec-
tion, i.e. bAB(rAB = 1) < bAB(rAB = 0).22 Furthermore, the bargaining cost should be
the Online Appendix.
21Without the bargaining cost, risk averse agents should always risk share in the Risk Only game. Empiri-
cally, only 63.3% of participants reach a contract with any transfers promised in the Risk Only game.
22This assumption is supported by behavior in the Risk Only game, as participants who indicate they know
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higher when effort cannot be observed if it incorporates mental costs such as uncertainty
about partner effort (Ellsberg, 1961), betrayal aversion (Bohnet et al., 2008) or transaction
costs due to moral hazard (Murgai et al., 2002). Finally, the relative benefit of a social
relationship on bargaining should be higher when effort cannot be observed (comparable to
Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001), for example if socially connected participants have better
information that influences their bargaining cost.
If we suppose that (ei = E, e−i = E) is optimal, then we can define the problem as:
max
τ ,eA,eB
EUA (piA, τ , eA, eB, bAB(rAB), tA(rAB))+EUB (piB, τ , eA, eB, bAB(rAB), tB(rAB))
(1.1)
If τ > 0, then, for each agent i (and her partner −i), the following incentive compatibility
constraint (ICC) must hold:
EUi (pii, τ , ei = E, e−i = E)−bAB(rAB) ≥ EUi (pii, τ , ei = N, e−i = E)−bAB(rAB)−di (rAB)
(1.2)
Similarly, the following participation constraint (PC) must hold:
EUi (pii, τ , ei = E, e−i = E)− bAB(rAB) ≥ EUi (pii, τ = 0, ei = E) (1.3)
Note that transfers promised in the Unobservable Effort game condition only on in-
come; thus, τ (pii, pi−i). Since transfers are promised only when incomes are unequal and
are symmetric, this results in a single choice, τ (pii, pi−i) = τ . In contrast, transfers in
the Observable Effort game condition on both income and effort, yielding four choices,
τ (pii, ei, pi−i, e−i) = {τEE, τEN , τNE, τNN}.23 In the experiment, participants are free to
choose any amount of transfer for each set of effort and income combination.
1.3.1 Model with Perfect Monitoring of Effort
In the Observable Effort game, the equilibrium specifies a vector of transfers,
τ = {τEE, τEN , τNE, τNN}. In this case, if either agent reneges, then both agents consume
autarky levels, i.e. no transfers are made. I use this grim trigger strategy (autarky if the
their partner take an average of 6.2 minutes to complete negotiations while participants who do not know
their partner take 7.6 minutes to complete negotiations (this difference is statistically significant at the 5%
level).
23τEE (τNN ) is the transfer from the agent that receives a high income to the agent that receives a low
income when both agents exert effort (do not exert effort). τEN is the transfer when the agent that exerts effort
receives a high income and the agent that does not exert effort receives a low income. τNE is the transfer
when the agent that exerts effort receives a low income and the agent that does not exert effort receives a high
income.
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defection occurs from intended effort levels) for expositional clarity.24
Agents with sufficiently high bargaining costs will prefer autarky (τ = 0) to risk shar-
ing (τ > 0). When bargaining costs make risk sharing preferable to autarky, full risk
sharing can be implemented for all costs of effort for which agents would have exerted
effort in autarky, as seen in Figure 1.2 (full risk sharing corresponds to τ = 100).25 For
these agents, neither the participation nor incentive compatibility constraints bind.26
In the model, social connections affect the extensive margin of risk sharing, i.e. whether
a contract with any transfers promised is reached. Since bargaining costs are lower for
agents with a social connection, these agents are more likely to engage in risk sharing and
reach a contract with transfers promised. Since the incentive compatibility constraint does
not bind (for all di(rAB)), social connections will not have an effect on the level of risk
sharing.
1.3.2 Model with Imperfect Monitoring of Effort
In the Unobservable Effort game, the equilibrium specifies a single transfer, τ . Whether
full risk sharing is implementable in equilibrium depends on the cost of effort, i.e. if the
incentive compatibility constraint may bind. In Figure 1.2, I show that for an intermediate
cost of effort (2.7 ≤ c ≤ 5.3), full risk sharing cannot be implemented (τ < 100) in equi-
librium. At this cost of effort, the agent would shirk if there was full risk sharing; knowing
this, their optimal transfer is lower and they exert effort in equilibrium. By contrast, when
c ≥ 5.3, full risk sharing (τ = 100) can be achieved, but agents do not exert effort in
equilibrium. Finally, when c ≤ 2.7, full risk sharing can be achieved and both agents exert
effort in equilibrium. Thus, the effects of unobservable effort on risk sharing will depend
on the cost of effort, which in practice corresponds to the difficulty of the task. For low and
intermediate costs of effort, imperfect monitoring has no effect.
With bargaining costs that are higher in the Unobservable Effort game, agents are less
likely to engage in risk sharing. If socially connected agents face relatively lower bargain-
ing costs in the Unobservable Effort game, social connections should have a larger effect
24The grim trigger strategy supports the highest level of insurance in equilibrium. In the context of limited
commitment, the qualitative properties of the equilibrium do not depend on the grim trigger assumption
(Ligon et al., 2002).
25For the figure, I assume an isoelastic utility function, U(pi, e) = (ω+pi−τ)
1−ρ
1−ρ − c(e) − bi(τ) where τ
is the level of transfer, pi = H,L is pre-transfer income, and ρ is the constant coefficient of relative risk
aversion. In the figure ρ = 0.5, H = 450, L = 250.
26Whether the participation constraint binds is a function of the bargaining cost; if bAB(rAB) = 0, then
the participation constraint would hold for all risk averse agents who would exert effort in autarky. In the
Observable Effort game, the incentive compatibility constraint will not bind due to the fact that defections
from the intended effort level can be punished.
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on whether a contract with any transfers promised emerges than in the Observable Effort
game. Finally, since social connections decrease the attractiveness of shirking, higher levels
of risk sharing can be achieved in equilibrium for socially connected agents if the incentive
compatibility constraint binds.27
1.3.3 Implications
Given my model, I can now summarize the predictions from the model.
Hypothesis 1: There will be less than or equal levels of risk sharing in the Unobserv-
able Effort game as compared to the Observable Effort game. Risk sharing will decrease
when the cost of effort is in the intermediate range. Risk sharing will not change when the
cost of effort is either high or low.
Hypothesis 2: Effort will either not change or decrease in the Unobservable Effort game
as compared to the Observable Effort game. When the cost of effort is high, then effort will
decrease. When the cost of effort is low or intermediate, then effort will not change.
Hypothesis 3: There is no effect of social connections on the level of risk sharing in the
Observable Effort game.
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive effect of social connections on the level of risk sharing
in the Unobservable Effort game when the cost of effort is in the intermediate range. When
the cost of effort is either low or high, then there will be no effect of social connections on
the level of risk sharing in the Unobservable Effort game.
Hypothesis 5: Participants are less likely to reach a contract with transfers promised in
the Unobservable Effort game as compared to the Observable Effort game.
Hypothesis 6: There is an effect of social connections on whether participants reach a
contract with transfers promised in both the Observable and Unobservable Effort games.
Hypothesis 7: Social connections will have a larger effect on whether a contract with
transfers promised is reached in the Unobservable Effort game.28
The most interesting case, when imperfect monitoring binds, occurs when effort is
related to a difficult but achievable task. To ensure that the cost of effort is effectively in the
intermediate range, I pilot the counting zeroes task to determine a threshold of 45 correct
answers that allows approximately 56% of participants to complete the task. However,
I cannot rule out the concern that ability may be a factor. I address this issue in further
27If the utility loss is increasing in the strength of the relationship between agents, then the effect of social
connections, both on the level of risk sharing and likelihood of risk sharing, should be increasing in the
strength of the social tie.
28Hypotheses 5-7 are due to inclusion of a bargaining cost in the model. Without the bargaining cost,
agents will always engage in risk sharing and promise positive transfers; in this case, Hypotheses 1-4 would
continue to hold.
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analysis in Section 5.6.2. In Section 5.5, I also consider whether the results differ as the




Before presenting the results of my analysis, I describe the contracts negotiated in the risk
sharing games. I then briefly discuss the Risk Only game, as it provides a benchmark for
interpreting subsequent results.
A description of the contracts is presented in Table 1.2. Transfers are in units of Kenyan
shillings. “Transfer Promised HL” is the transfer promised when a participant receives
H and her partner receives L. A transfer with a negative value implies that the transfer
would be received and a positive value implies that the transfer would be given. Thus, a
transfer with a negative value in the {H,L} state implies that the transfer is given from
the individual receiving low income to the individual receiving high income. “Transfer
Promised HH” (“Transfer Promised LL”) is the absolute value of the transfer promised
when both participants receive H (L); without this absolute value, the means would be
zero by construction. I display the summary statistics separately for payment schemes 1
(H = 100, L = −100) and 2 (H = 400, L = 0). Altogether I have a sample of 426
participants, with each participant playing each of the three risk sharing games.29 30
Although transfers can be used for purposes other than risk sharing, it is reassuring that
transfers promised from the participant receiving low income to the participant receiving
high income are rare, occurring only 3.0% of the time in the Observable Effort game and
3.3% of the time in each in the Risk Only and Unobservable Effort games. I do not consider
the transfers made when both participants receive high income, when both receive low
income or asymmetric transfers, which may occur for purposes other than risk sharing.31
29During one session, the computers were lagging during the counting zeros task in the Observable Effort
game. For the 20 affected participants, all variables that relate to the task are set to missing.
30In the paper I rescale and pool data for the two payment schemes. The results provided in the remainder
of the paper are qualitatively similar if I run the analysis with controls for payment scheme; the results of the
separate analyses are available in the Online Appendix.
31{H,H} and {L,L} transfers occur for 4.7% of pairs in the Risk Only game, 9.4% of pairs in the Ob-
servable Effort game, and 3.3% of pairs in the Unobservable Effort game. Asymmetric transfers are cases
in which the transfer promised when a participant receives high income and her partner receives low income
is not equal to the transfer promised when the roles are reversed. These types of transfers are also relatively
infrequent, occurring for 5.2% of pairs in the Risk Only game, 13.3% of pairs in the Observable Effort game,
and 4.9% pairs in the Unobservable Effort games. Theoretically, these transfers may occur due to differences
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I next discuss the Risk Only game to set the context for interpreting my main results.
In the Risk Only game, full risk sharing for a participant (partner) who receives income H
(L) corresponds to a transfer of 100 KSH in payment scheme 1 (H = 100, L = −100)
and 200 KSH in payment scheme 2 (H = 400, L = 0).32 Table 1.2 Column (9) presents
the rescaled payment schemes so that full risk sharing corresponds to 100. I find that
the average transfer in the Risk Only game is only 25.7%. Furthermore, only 63.1% of
partnerships reach a contract with any transfers promised. Very few (7.7%) participants
promise transfers at the level of full risk sharing. Although risk sharing is low, this is not
an unusual finding in experiments that focus on risk sharing (Fischer, 2013; Attanasio et
al. 2012). It is also consistent with the results of field experiments that show low take-up
of formal weather insurance products (Gine´ et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2013; Gine´ and Yang,
2009).
1.4.2 The Effects of Imperfect Monitoring
I use regressions of the following form:
yi = α0 + α1 · UN + µi + i
where i indexes the subject and µi represents individual fixed effects, which implicitly
include game order and session effects as well as participant characteristics such as ability,
altruism and risk aversion. Furthermore, yi denotes the outcome of interest and UN is
a dummy for the Unobservable Effort Game. For all following analyses I use data from
the Observable and Unobservable Effort games.33 α1 measures the difference in behavior
between the Unobservable and the Observable Effort games (i.e. the effect of imperfect
monitoring). I present the summary statistics across all participants in Table 1.3. The
results will differ once I control for individual fixed effects in Table 2.4.
I have three outcomes of interest, as motivated by the theory. One outcome of interest is
the level of risk sharing, measured as the transfer promised if a participant receives high in-
come and her partner receives low income (“Transfers Promised”). The effect of imperfect
monitoring on transfers promised will depend on which promised transfer I use from the
Observable Effort game. For the analysis, I use the transfer promised when a participant
receives high income and her partner receives low income conditional on whether each
in bargaining power, risk preferences, or altruism. These transfers are interesting and I examine motives for
the transfers in Jain (2016).
32This predictions holds if agents are homogenous and risk averse.
33With only 25 sessions, I do not cluster standard errors by session. In the Online Appendix I provide all
results with use of the wild cluster-bootstrap percentile-t procedure (Cameron et al., 2008).
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completes the task (“Conditional on Effort” in Table 1.3). This is the transfer that would
be made under income inequality. However, this confounds the choice of promised trans-
fers with effort, since whether each participant completes the task determines the transfer.
In the Robustness section, I examine the effect of imperfect monitoring when the highest
transfer promised in the Observable Effort game is used (“Max Transfers HL in Obs Game”
in Table 1.3). A second outcome of interest is the extensive margin of risk sharing, whether
a contract with transfers promised is reached (“Any Transfers Promised”). If no transfers
are promised then participants are in autarky, as their partners’ choices do not affect their
own choices or outcomes. For the analyses, I code all transfers relative to the amount cor-
responding to full risk sharing. The last outcome of interest is effort. My primary measure
of effort is whether a participant completed the task (“Completed Task”).34
Given the above outcomes of interest, I now present my main results.
Result 1: Transfers promised are unaffected by the observability of effort.
The model predicts that participants will exhibit less than or equal levels of risk sharing in
the Unobservable Effort versus the Observable Effort game. Whether imperfect monitoring
affects transfers depends on the cost of effort. The results in Table 2.4 Panel B Column
(1) show that promised transfers are slightly (3.5%), but not significantly, lower in the
Unobservable Effort game than the Observable Effort game. This finding can also be seen
in the comparison of mean transfers by game in Table 1.3. When I examine whether there
is an effect of imperfect monitoring on the intensive margin, restricting the comparison of
promised transfers to the subsample that reach a contract with any transfers promised, the
results in Table 1.5 Panel A Column (1) show that risk sharing is slightly (9.6%) but not
significantly higher in the Unobservable Effort Game.
Recall that theory predicts that the level of risk sharing will stay constant only if the
cost of effort is low or high. Thus, the finding that transfers are not affected by monitoring
of effort is counter to argument of an intermediate cost of effort or suggests that transfers
are not the relevant margin of risk sharing.
Result 2: Participants are 7% less likely to reach a contract with any transfers promised
due to imperfect monitoring.
If bargaining costs are higher in the Unobservable Effort game, then participants should be
34I could use whether participants watch the video provided or the number of grids answered correctly in
the counting zeros task as alternative measures of effort. Since completion of the task is the relevant outcome
for income, I do not include these as outcomes in the regression analysis; I do provide summary statistics
in Table 1.3 for these outcomes and include results with these alternative measures of effort in the Online
Appendix.
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less likely to reach a contract with transfers promised in the Unobservable Effort game. The
results in Table 2.4 Panel A Column (1) show that participants are 4.7 percentage points
(7%) less likely to reach a contract with any transfers promised in the Unobservable Effort
game (significant at the 5% level). The difference is not statistically significant without
fixed effects, as can be seen in Table 1.3.
Result 3: Participants are equally likely to complete the task in the games with effort.
The model predicts that effort should either not change or decrease in the Unobservable
Effort game. Both the summary statistics in Table 1.3 and the regression results in Table
2.4 Panel C Column (1) show that participants are similarly likely to complete the task in
the games with effort. The magnitude is not trivial, as the coefficient corresponds to a 7%
increase in completion of the task.
It is possible that the results reflect both the effects of imperfect monitoring and ad-
verse selection (if ability is private information). If task completion was simply a function
of effort, I expect that participants would either choose not to complete the task (0 correct
answers) or to answer the minimum number of grids necessary to complete the task (45
correct answers). The results in Figure 1.3 show that this is not the case. Few participants
(7.5%) ever press the button to watch the video and 94% of participants attempt the count-
ing task into the last 30 seconds of the task. Thus, although I cannot dismiss the concern
that task completion reflects both effort and ability, this does not confound my results if
ability is game-invariant and does not affect behavior differentially between the games. In
the Robustness Section, I consider whether ability impacts my findings.
To provide further confidence in my results, I remove the individual fixed effects and
instead control for game order and payment scheme. The results in Table 1.6 Column (1)
are similar, although there is evidence of statistically significant order and payment scheme
effects. I find some evidence that social proximity has an overall effect by decreasing the
level of risk sharing (Panel B) and decreasing effort (Panel C).35 36 37
35I also pool the data from all three risk sharing games to examine whether the results are similar with part-
ner fixed effects. Comparing the behavior in the Unobservable Effort and Risk Only games to the Observable
Effort game, I find the same pattern for the coefficient on the dummy for the Unobservable Effort game, as
shown in Appendix Table C.2 Columns (1) and (5).
36I also confirm that my findings are not a result of within-subject design, by estimating the effects for the
first game played in the Online Appendix, essentially treating the sample as a between-subject experiment.
37Lastly, 94 participants are randomly rematched with the same partner in both the Observable and Unob-
servable Effort games . I examine these partnerships separately in the Online Appendix.
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1.4.3 The Role of Social Proximity
In order to measure the effects of social proximity on effort and risk sharing, I use several
measures to capture different dimensions of social proximity.
The first measure of social proximity is a dummy for whether the participant lives in the
same village in Kibera (84% of participants) and belongs to the same ethnic group (56% of
participants) as their partner (“Same VE Group”), created from laboratory records. By this
measure, 52% of participants live in the same village and speak the same language as their
partner. This measure captures weaker social ties.
The remaining measures of social proximity are taken from the survey responses, in
which participants indicate which of the following describe their relationship with their
partners (adapted from Banerjee et al., 2013): 1. He/she visits my home or I visit his/her
home, 2. He/she is my kin or family, 3. He/she is not a relative with whom I socialize, 4. I
would borrow or lend money from him/her, 5. I would borrow or lend material goods (such
as food, coal, etc) from him/her, 6. I get or give advice from him/her, 7. I pray (at a temple,
church or mosque) with him or her, 8. I work with him/her, 9. I know this person but do
not do any of the previous activities with him/her, and 10. I do not know this person.
“Partner Rel” is a dummy that indicates whether a participant does not choose “I do
not know this person” (out network link). In my study, 25% of participants fall into this
category, while 14% fall into the two-way category (“Partnership Rel - Two Way,” and
network link). Since both participants must acknowledge the relationship in “Partnership
Rel - Two Way”, it corresponds to a stronger social link than “Partnership Rel.” Given
that participants rarely interact with their partner on more than one dimension, the results
should be interpreted as measuring the effects of relatively weak social ties.38
Given the above measures of social proximity, my empirical strategy consists of regres-
sions with the following form:
yij = α0 + α1 · UN + α2 · relationshipij + α3 · relationshipij · UN + µi + ij
where i indexes the subject, j indexes the partner, µi represents individual fixed effects, UN
is a dummy for the Unobservable Effort game, relationshipij is one of the three measures
for social proximity, and yi denotes the outcomes of interest. The coefficients of interest
are α1, α2 and α3. Here, α1 measures the effect of imperfect monitoring for participants
who do not have a relationship with their partner. α2 measures whether social connections
38I can also generate an index to measure whether the strength of a social tie has an effect. Since only 36
of 852 participant pairs interact with their partner in more than one dimension, I include this measure, as well
as other measures of social proximity, in the Online Appendix.
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have an overall effect. α3 measures whether social connections have a different effect in the
Unobservable Effort game than in the Observable Effort game. α2 + α3 measures whether
socially connected individuals behave differently than individuals who do not know each
other in the Unobservable Effort Game. Finally, α1 + α3 measures whether socially con-
nected individuals behave differently due to imperfect monitoring.39
1.4.3.1 The Effects of Imperfect Monitoring: Socially Unconnected
Focusing on the coefficient α1 in Table 2.4 Panel A, I find that for all measures of social
proximity, participants who do not know their partner are 9-12% less likely to engage in
risk sharing in the Unobservable Effort game than in the Observable Effort game. For my
preferred measure of social proximity, “Partner Rel”, I find that participants who do not
know their partner are 7.3 percentage points (11%) less likely to reach a contract with any
transfers promised as a result of imperfect monitoring of effort.
Table 2.4 Panel B shows that I cannot reject that there is no effect of imperfect moni-
toring on the level of transfers. Note that the magnitudes when participants indicate they
know their partner are large, corresponding to a 13% and 11% decrease in transfers for
“Partner Rel” and “Partnership Rel - Two Way” respectively. The results in Panel C also
show no effect of imperfect monitoring on task completion. Although the coefficients in
Panel C are not statistically significant from zero, the coefficient suggest that participants
are 2-5% more likely to complete the task when they do not know their partner due to im-
perfect monitoring of effort. Conditional on risk sharing, the results in Table 1.5 suggest
that unconnected participants who risk share are unaffected by imperfect monitoring; note
that the magnitudes correspond to 5-8.5% less completion of the task and 4-32% higher
transfers.
1.4.3.2 Overall Effects of Social Proximity
Regarding α2, I find several results of note regarding the overall effects of social proximity.
Result 4: Social connections have no effect on the overall level of transfers.
The model predicts that social connections should have no effect on the level of risk sharing
in the Observable Effort game as the contracts should incentivize the optimal level of effort.
The results in Table 2.4 Panel B vary in both sign and magnitude (ranging from 3-19%) for
all measures of social ties, and are not statistically significant. Consistent with the theory, I
39Qualitatively the pattern is similar if I examine the effects of social proximity with partner fixed effects
in Appendix Table C.2. The results in Table 1.6 remain similar if I omit individual fixed effects and instead
include game order and payment controls.
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find no detectable effect of social connections overall.
Result 5: There is no effect of social connections on the likelihood that participants risk
share and reach a contract with transfers promised.
The model predicts that socially connected participants are more likely to reach a contract
with transfers promised due to lower bargaining costs, and also potentially due to altruism.
The results in Table 2.4 Panel A show no statistically significant effect of social ties on
whether participants engage in risk sharing. The magnitudes are not trivial, as weakly
connected participants are 14% (not statistically significant) more likely to engage in risk
sharing.
1.4.3.3 The Effects of Social Ties When Monitoring is Imperfect
Focusing on coefficients α3, α2 + α3, and α1 + α3, I find several key results.
Result 6: Social connections have a large positive effect on whether a contract with any
transfers promised is reached in the Unobservable Effort game.
If the work incentive for socially connected participants is increasing in the strength of
the relationship, then this effect (α3) should be largest when both participants indicate they
know each other; it should also be larger when a participant indicates she knows her partner
than when participants belong to the same village-ethnic group. The results in Table 2.4
Panel A show that α3 is positive, and both substantively and statistically significant at the
10% level or better for the measures of social proximity in which a participant indicates
they know their partner; thus, social connections have a different effect in the Unobservable
Effort game. The magnitudes are large, corresponding to an 11.6 percentage point (17%)
and 29 percentage point (42%) effect for “Partner Rel” and “Partnership Rel - Two Way,”
respectively.
As a result of the large effect, participants with a social connection to their partner are
more likely to engage in risk sharing than participants with no connection to their partner
when effort cannot be observed, that is α2 + α3 > 0. Specifically, I find that the effect is
18% for those belonging to the same village and ethnic group, 31% for participants who
indicate they to know their partner, and 47% when both participants indicate they know
each other.
I also examine whether socially connected participants are more likely to engage in risk
sharing in the Unobservable Effort game than in the Observable Effort game, that is α1+α3.
I find that α1 + α3 is statistically different from zero when both participants indicate they
know each other, with an effect of 20.9 percentage points (30%, statistically significant at
the 1% level), but statistically indistinguishable from zero for the other measures of so-
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cial proximity.40 If risk sharing outside the laboratory occurs among socially connected
individuals, then this represents the effects of imperfect monitoring for these individuals.
This result shows that the decision of socially connected participants to risk share is largely
unaffected by imperfect monitoring. Indeed, socially connected participants may be more
likely to risk share when effort cannot be observed.
Result 7: Social connections have a different effect on the level of risk sharing in the
Unobservable Effort game than in the Observable Effort game.
The results in Table 2.4 Panel B show that social connections have a different effect in the
Unobservable Effort game. Again, α3 is substantively and statistically significant at the
10% level or better for all measures of social proximity in which a participant indicates she
knows her partner. Specifically, participants who know their partner receive an additional
38%; this effect is 57% when both participants indicate they know each other.
The results for α2 + α3 show that socially connected individuals are not more likely
to promise higher transfers than unconnected individuals in the Unobservable Effort game,
except when both the participant and her partner claim to know each other. However,
the magnitudes are substantively large, as participants who indicate they know their partner
promise 19% higher transfers than those who do not when effort cannot be observed. When
both participants indicate they know each other, transfers promised are 53% higher.
Lastly, α1 + α3 is substantively large for measures in which participants indicate they
know their partner, corresponding to 25% (not statistically significant) when a participant
indicates she knows her partner and 46% (statistically significant at the 10% level).
Note that for both the level of transfers promised and the degree of risk sharing, α2 +α3
is larger when both participants indicate they know each other; similarly α2 + α3 is larger
for participants who indicate they know their partner compared to those who belong to
the same village-ethnic group. These findings support the idea that the effect of social
proximity is increasing in the strength of the relationship.
Since social proximity affects the extensive margin, whether participants risk share, I
examine the effects of social proximity on transfers for individuals who engage in risk shar-
ing. The results in Table 1.5 Panel A show a similar pattern, albeit not significantly, for α2,
α3, α2 + α3, and α1 + α3.
40The theory does not necessarily predict that α1 +α3 > 0. If socially connected individuals are motivated
by intrinsic motives to cooperate in the Unobservable Effort game and extrinsic motives in the Observable
Effort game (since incentives to work are written into the contract) , then α1 + α3 > 0 suggests that the
intrinsic motives are stronger than the extrinsic motives.
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Result 8: Social connections have a different effect on task completion in the Unobserv-
able Effort game.
The theory has ambiguous predictions for the overall effect of social proximity on effort,
since the effects on effort depend on what is preferred in autarky and how risk sharing is
affected. The results in Table 2.4 Panel C show that there is a different effect of social prox-
imity in the Unobservable Effort game, corresponding to 19.2 percentage points (34%) for
participants who both indicate they know their partner. As a result, these participants are
25% likely to exert effort in the Unobservable Effort game than participants who do not
know their partner. In addition, these participants are 20.5 percentage points (36%) more
likely to complete the task in the Unobservable Effort game than in the Observable Effort
game. The coefficients when a participant indicates she knows her partner follow a similar
pattern but are not statistically significant. Conditioning on risk sharing, the results in Table
1.5 show the same qualitative pattern.
In addition, I find that my observed effects would have meaningful impacts on indi-
viduals’ welfare. Participants who know each other would receive 6% higher consumption
(statistically significant at the 10% level) and less volatility in consumption (not statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level) than participants who do not know each other when
effort cannot be observed. If all participants exert effort and fully risk share, participants
could receive up to 15% higher income and reduce income volatility by 29%. Thus, my
results indicate that socially proximate individuals are substantially closer to efficient levels
of risk sharing than individuals that are not socially connected.41
1.4.4 Validation from a Low Cost of Effort Experiment
To provide greater confidence in my results, I run a similar experiment that decreases the
cost of effort. In this experiment, a separate sample of 226 individuals (14 sessions) play
the same risk sharing games, with the exception that participants must only answer 20 grids
correctly. Completion of this task requires substantially less effort and 90% of participants
complete the task in the experiment. Note that the sample size is smaller and so I have less
power to detect statistically significant effects.
The model predicts that when monitoring is imperfect and the cost of effort is low,
the incentive to work is always stronger than the incentive to shirk. Thus, there should
41For these estimates I simulate income given the risk sharing contracts and effort choices in the experiment
for 50 periods. Depending on the income realizations of each participant and partner, I calculate transfers
from the contracts in each period. Consumption is income net of transfers. For each participant, I estimate
the average consumption and standard deviation of consumption across all periods. I refer to the standard
deviation of consumption as consumption volatility. Further details are provided in the Online Appendix.
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be no difference in the level of risk sharing between the Observable and Unobservable
Effort games. The results in Table 1.7 Column (5)-(8) show no statistically significant
additional effect of social connections (α3) on the level of transfers in the Unobservable
Effort game, with magnitudes ranging from 12-45%. The results in Column (1)-(4) also
show no statistically significant effect of imperfect monitoring on whether a contract with
any transfers promised, with magnitudes ranging from 5.5-11%. Since magnitudes do not
increase as the strength of the social connection increases, I conclude that these results
support the model predictions.
When the cost of effort is low, I find some evidence that social proximity has an effect
overall. For the level of transfers, α2 is sometimes statistically significant and the mag-
nitudes are substantively large (121% and 107% for “Partner Rel” and “Partner Rel Two
Way” on transfers promised respectively and, 29% and 8.5 % effect on whether transfers
are promised). For the level of transfers, α2 + α3 and α1 + α3 are substantively but not
statistically large, since the overall level of transfers is low. I also find that α2 + α3 is sub-
stantively large for any transfers, suggesting that socially proximate individuals risk share
more than unknown participants when effort cannot be observed.
Overall, the results from this experiment indicate that social proximity has no additional
effect in the Unobservable Effort game, as expected, when shirking is not a concern and
the task can easily be completed by all participants.
1.4.5 Robustness
In this section, I explore the robustness of my results by considering alternative specifica-
tions and whether ability plays a confounding role.
1.4.5.1 Interpretation with Alternative Counterfactual of Transfers in the Observ-
able Effort Game
Recall that in the Observable Effort game, a high (low) income participant (partner) match
yields four potential transfers promised since transfers condition on effort. Thus far I have
used the transfers that would have been made if a participant had received high income and
her partner low income.
In this section, I instead use the highest amount of transfer promised when a participant
receives high income and her partner low income among the four potential transfers. This is
a hypothetical counterfactual and represents the first-best contract in the Observable Effort
game. This is not necessarily the transfer that would be made in practice, but the highest
transfer that participants could potentially receive.
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The results in Table 1.8 show that transfers promised are statistically and significantly
lower due to imperfect monitoring, with an overall 26% decrease in the level of transfers
(23-30% for participants who have no relationship with their partner). The results are
consistent with the finding that socially connected individuals promise relatively higher
transfers than those that are not in the Unobservable Effort game, since both α3 and α2+α3
are substantively large, albeit not statistically significant.
Note that the effort associated with the highest promised transfer in the Observable
Effort game is not the same as the effort chosen in the experiment. Thus, a lack of a
statistically significant effect of social proximity in Table 1.8 combined with significant
effects in Table 2.4 is the result of the fact that participants who know their partner are less
likely to shirk in the Unobservable Effort game than in the Observable Effort game.
1.4.5.2 Ability as a Potentially Confounding Factor
Although the counting task was chosen to minimize the role of ability, there is the pos-
sibility that the nature of the task confounds the effect of imperfect monitoring with that
of adverse selection. Since I use a within-subject design, ability would confound my re-
sults only if it affects contract negotiations of the contract in the Unobservable Effort game
differently than in the Observable Effort game.42
To examine this question, I confine the sample to only participants for whom comple-
tion of the task is achievable and thus task completion is presumably the result of effort.
I determine which participants are able to complete the task based on the number of grids
each participant answered correctly in a two-minute practice round. I restrict the sample to
participants who score between 15 and 21 answers correctly on this practice round (median
score = 13), resulting in a sample of 128 participants.43
The results using this subsample are presented in Table 1.9. Overall, I find similar
results for the effects of imperfect monitoring and social proximity for the following out-
comes: whether participants engage in risk sharing and whether they complete the task.
42I extend the model to consider the effect of ability on risk sharing in the Online Appendix, in which I
consider the effect of ability both when ability is common knowledge and when ability is private information.
The theory predicts that participants who are similar in ability to their partner or who believe that partners will
complete the task should be more likely to reach a contract with risk sharing. However, I find little support
for this empirically. For adverse selection to explain the results with regard to social proximity, it would have
to be the case that socially connected participants are more likely to be similar in ability and more likely to
know their partners’ ability. I also find little support for this empirically.
43Since there is some learning between the practice round and the tasks in the games, I include individuals
scoring more than 15 answers correctly. I expect these are the individuals for whom the cost of effort is in
the intermediate range. Individuals who score below 15 are those who would change their behavior due to
adverse selection. Individuals who score above 21 should find the task easy and should not be affected by
moral hazard issues.
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Notably, the effects on whether participants risk share are larger in magnitude than those
for the full sample. For the level of risk sharing, the results are different both statistically, as
transfers are 34% lower as a result of imperfect monitoring, and in the pattern found. I do
not find any effect of social connections either overall or differentially in the Unobservable
Effort game. Qualitatively, the effects on task completion are similar. Thus I conclude that
adverse selection cannot explain my results found for the effects of imperfect monitoring
and social connections on the extensive margin of risk sharing.
1.5 Mechanisms Driving the Effect of Social Connections
In this section, I examine the mechanisms through which social connections have an effect.
Specifically, I focus on whether socially connected participants have better information
about their partner or whether socially connected participants are more likely to believe that
their partner completed the task. Based on the pattern of results, I can rule out altruism,
since social connections do not have an overall effect.
First I examine whether participants who have a relationship with their partner have
better information about the partner. If participants are socially connected, they may have
better information about their partners’ ability, risk aversion, preferences, or working be-
havior. They could leverage this information to better negotiate with their partner, or the in-
formation could generate more trust in the Unobservable Effort game. As a result, socially
connected participants should be more likely to engage in risk sharing in the Unobservable
Effort game than participants who are not socially connected.
To measure partner knowledge, participants are asked whether they think their partner
completed the task in the Unobservable Effort game (mean 0.594) after the risk sharing
games were played, before incomes were announced. This measure captures whether par-
ticipants correctly guessed whether their partner completed the task in the Unobservable
Effort game.
The second measure is an index of participants’ knowledge about their partners. After
the experiment, I implement a survey, in which I ask a series of questions about one of three
partners from the session.44 Participants receive 50 KSH for one randomly selected answer
if their answer is the same as their partner’s response for herself. I generate a measure of
how well the participant knows the partner with an index of the number of the questions
answered correctly, ranging from 0 (does not answer a single question correctly about their
44The questions relate to the partner’s household relative income, proportion of income from their own
work, number of people in the household, marital status, employment, whether the partner has been unable to
work in the past month due to illness, housing status (own, rent, live without pay), and whether the partner’s
household has electricity, TV, refrigerator, bicycle, or vehicle.
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partner) to 1 (answers all questions about their partner correctly), with a mean value of
0.616.
Alternatively, social connections result in a stronger incentive for participants to coop-
erate (and risk share) or work in the Unobservable Effort game. This could be the result
of intrinsic motives or incentives generated by the repeated game that socially connected
participants are engaged in outside the laboratory. As an imperfect test of this mechanism, I
examine whether socially connected individuals are more likely to believe that their partner
completed the task in the Unobservable Effort game, using whether a participant guesses
that their partner completed the task (mean 0.556) as a measure of belief in their partner.
I regress each measure of social proximity on whether the participant believes their part-
ner completed the task, whether the participant’s belief is correct, and their index knowl-
edge score. The questions included in the index are asked for only one of the three partners
in the session, which decreases the sample substantially. Therefore, I show the results
with (sample of 169) and without the index (sample of 406). The results in Table 1.10
are correlations that provide suggestive evidence of the mechanism through which social
connections have an effect.
Overall, I find that participants who are socially connected are not more likely to know
whether their partner completed the task and are slightly less likely to answer questions
about their partner correctly (corresponding to a lower score in “Index Knowledge Part-
ner”). Thus, I conclude that social connections do not correspond to better information.
In addition, I find weak evidence that stronger social connections correspond to a higher
belief that the partner completes the task in the Unobservable Effort game, specifically for
the sample without the index. The coefficient is statistically significant only for the “Partner
Relationship - Two Way” (at the 5% level), but the coefficient is positive and substantively
large for the “Partner Relationship”. Also, as expected, the magnitude is larger when both
participants know each other than when a participant indicates she knows her partner. Thus
I find some evidence that social connections have an effect through belief that one’s partner
will complete the task.
1.6 Conclusion
This study examines the role of social connections and monitoring of effort on risk sharing
in Kenya using a novel laboratory experiment with risk sharing games. My experimental
design allows me to vary whether effort is observable, while holding other dimensions
of the economic environment fixed, in order to causally identify the effects of imperfect
monitoring on risk sharing. By randomizing partners across games, I can examine the role
26
of social proximity while controlling for individual characteristics such as altruism and risk
aversion.
My findings show, first, that participants are 7% less likely to risk share due to imperfect
monitoring of effort. Among individuals who do not have a relationship with their partner,
participants are 11% less likely to risk share. However, I find no effect of monitoring on
level of risk sharing.
Second, I find that participants who know their partner are 31% more likely to risk share
than participants who do not know their partner when effort cannot be observed. Among
participants with a stronger connection to their partner, participants are 47% more likely
to engage in risk sharing, promise 53% higher transfers and 25% more likely to complete
the task when effort cannot be observed. For socially connected individuals, imperfect
monitoring has no effect on risk sharing. The impacts of these choices are substantively
significant, as socially connected individuals would achieve a 6% higher income over time.
To gain insight into my results, I explore the mechanisms for the effects of social con-
nections to find suggestive evidence that participants who are socially connected are more
likely to believe that their partners exert effort, and find no evidence that social connections
correspond to better information.
Since risk sharing is an important mechanism through which poor households can
smooth consumption, my results indicate that social ties are important in understanding
how these households cope with income shocks. Because risk sharing outside of the labo-
ratory occurs in the presence of many market imperfections such as limited commitment,
hidden income, and imperfect monitoring, a natural avenue of future research is to exam-
ine whether the effect of social connections persists when additional market imperfections
are introduced. Given that risk sharing occurs between dispersed family members (Rosen-
zweig and Stark, 1989), monitoring of effort is imperfect. As technological innovations
(such as mobile money) change the geographic distances over which risk sharing occurs
(Jack and Suri, 2014), risk sharing in the future will increasingly be affected by the prob-
lems of imperfect monitoring. This paper provides evidence that the effects of imperfect
monitoring will depend on the strength of ties in the risk sharing network. My research
provides a starting point for future work on how networks and the strength of social ties are
affected by changes in migration or technology.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: The Counting Task
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Figure 1.2: Optimal Transfers as a Function of Cost of Effort
Observable Effort Unobservable Effort
Table 1.1: Characteristics of Subject Pool
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nairobi/Kenya Busara Subjects Experiment Range
Age (years) 31.34 32.19 19-65
Male 51.15 ∗ 45.47 40.00
Education (%)
Some Primary 36.95 ∗ 47.81 34.70
Some Secondary 32.30 ∗ 39.99 51.90
Some College or University 19.13 ∗ 9.05 13.20
Native Language (%)
Luhya 13.83 19.47 31.29
Luo 10.48 19.16 35.29
Kikuyu 17.15 25.04 10.35
Other 58.54 36.33 23.07
Married (%)
Single 19.74 47.79 45.88
Married or Cohabiting 71.17 44.84 46.32
Divorced, separated, widowed 9.08 7.37 7.80
Other Sessions Attended 1.98 0-13
Notes: 425 observations. Statistics for Nairobi/Kenya are taken from Haushofer et al. (2014). ∗Data used for
Nairobi.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Risk Only, Observable Effort and Unobservable Effort
Games Contracts
Payment Scheme 1 Payment Scheme 2 Overall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean Min Max + Mean Min Max + Rescaled
Risk Only Game
Transfer Promised HH 3.256 0 100 0.078 0.000 0 0 0.000 1.972
[14.558] [0.000] [11.432]
Transfer Promised HL 22.752 -100 100 0.562 60.774 0 250 0.655 25.763
[32.517] [67.407] [33.162]
Transfer Promised LL 0.078 0 10 0.008 0.000 0 0 0.000 0.047
[0.879] [0.000] [0.684]
Observable Effort Game
Both Exert Effort (EE)
Transfer Promised HH 3.100 0 100 0.062 1.309 0 100 0.012 2.070
[14.538] [10.919] [12.115]
Transfer Promised HL 24.574 -100 100 0.570 62.321 -50 250 0.667 27.352
[34.029] [69.730] [34.750]
Transfer Promised LL 0.775 0 50 0.016 0.000 0 0 0.000 0.269
[6.189] [0.000] [3.661]
One Exerts Effort, Other Does Not (EN, NE)
Transfer Promised HH 2.752 0 100 0.063 0.655 0 25 0.018 1.796
[12.089] [3.842] [9.544]
Transfer Promised HL 22.578 -100 100 0.512 57.113 -50 250 0.631 24.935
[30.582] [69.670] [32.418]
Transfer Promised LL 1.969 0 50 0.016 0.060 0 5 0.006 0.4599
[6.544] [0.543] [5.113]
Both Do Not Exert Effort (NN)
Transfer Promised HH 2.480 0 100 0.047 0.000 0 0 0.000 1.075
[12.352] [0.000] [8.928]
Transfer Promised HL 20.233 -100 100 0.465 54.702 -50 250 0.554 23.320
[12.352] [72.268] [33.807]
Transfer Promised LL 1.937 0 50 0.081 0.000 0 0 0.000 0.807
[11.507] [0.000] [8.169]
Unobservable Effort Game
Transfer Promised HH 2.171 0 100 0.039 2.381 0 100 0.024 1.502
[13.201] [15.291] [9.682]
Transfer Promised HL 22.287 -100 100 0.535 56.131 -100 400 0.643 23.040
[34.313] [71.869] [33.913]
Transfer Promised LL 0.465 0 50 0.008 0.000 0 0 0.000 1.174
[4.474] [0.000] [8.999]
Notes: Transfer is the transfer promised from a participant to her partner for each set of incomes. For incomes HH and
LL, I list the absolute values of the transfer promised. In payment scheme (1), H = 100 KSH, L= -100 KSH with 204
observations. In payment scheme (2), H= 400 KSH, L = 0 KSH with 168 individuals. + refers to the proportion of
observations in which positive transfers are made. Rescaled refers to average net transfers when transfers rescaled and
pooled. Standard deviations are in brackets. 34
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics for Outcomes of Interest
(1) (2) (3)=(2)-(1) (4) (5) (6)
Observable Unobservable Difference Min Max N
Effort Effort Means
Game Game
Contract With Any Transfers Promised 0.686 0.639 −0.046 0 1 426
[0.023] [0.023] [0.032]
Transfers Promised∧
Conditional on Effort◦ 25.801 24.566 −1.235 -100 200 406
[1.746] [1.663] [2.410]
Conditional Effort◦, Always Non-Zero Transfers 44.013 40.250 −3.763 -100 200 295
[2.347] [2.235] [3.240]
Max Transfers HL in Obs Game× 33.181 24.566 −8.615∗∗∗ -100 200 424
[1.821] [1.662] [2.466]
Completed Task 0.537 0.589 0.052 0 1 406
[0.025] [0.024] [0.034]
Number of Correct Answers (Threshold 45) 42.360 44.559 2.199∗∗ 0 80 406
[0.740] [0.67] [0.501]
Watch Video 0.064 0.085 0.021 0 1 406
[0.012] [0.014] [0.018]
Notes: N refers to observations. ∧Transfer is the transfer promised from a participant to her partner if the participant receives high
income and her partner receives low income. ◦Transfer promised given whether a participant and partner completed the task in
the Observable Effort game. ×Highest transfer from four transfers promised if a participant receives high income and her partner
receives low income in Observable Effort game. Standard errors are in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Figure 1.3: Histogram of Correct Answers in Observable Effort and Unobservable Effort
Games
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Table 1.4: The Effects of Imperfect Monitoring and Social Proximity
Panel A: Any Transfers Promised
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Same Partner Partner
VE Rel Rel
Group Two Way
Unobservable Effort Game (α1) −0.047∗∗ −0.062∗ −0.073∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗
[0.024] [0.036] [0.028] [0.026]
Relationship (α2) 0.094 0.097 0.036
[0.061] [0.061] [0.067]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) 0.033 0.116∗ 0.290∗∗∗
[0.052] [0.062] [0.086]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 0.127∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
Std. Dev.: α2 + α3 [0.061] [0.062] [0.073]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 −0.029 0.043 0.209∗∗∗
Std. Dev.: α1 + α3 [0.034] [0.052] [0.078]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 0.685 0.692 0.685 0.696
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev. [0.465] [0.463] [0.465] [0.461]
R-squared 0.009 0.019 0.036 0.055
Panel B: Transfers Promised
Unobservable Effort Game (α1) −0.911 0.865 −3.659 −2.895
[2.060] [3.253] [2.505] [2.311]
Relationship (α2) 0.545 −5.301 −0.903
[5.257] [5.260] [5.795]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) −3.303 10.420∗ 15.280∗∗
[4.615] [5.427] [7.486]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 −2.758 5.116 14.373∗∗
Std. Dev.: α2 + α3 [5.239] [5.388] [6.320]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 −2.438 6.759 12.382∗
Std. Dev.: α1 + α3 [2.948] [4.498] [6.750]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 25.800 22.127 27.525 27.003
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev. [35.190] [27.629] [35.326] [35.382]
R-squared 0.000 0.002 0.010 0.014
Continues Onto the Next Page...
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Panel C: Completed Task
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Same Partner Partner
VE Rel Rel
Group Two Way
Unobservable Effort Game (α1) 0.039 0.022 0.027 0.013
[0.026] [0.041] [0.031] [0.029]
Relationship (α2) −0.113∗ −0.043 −0.053
[0.066] [0.066] [0.073]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) 0.029 0.047 0.192∗∗
[0.058] [0.068] [0.094]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 −0.085 0.004 0.140∗
Std. Dev.: α2 + α3 [0.065] [0.068] [0.079]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 0.505 0.074 0.205∗∗
Std. Dev.: α1 + α3 [0.037] [0.057] [0.085]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 0.537 0.564 0.569 0.564
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev [0.499] [0.497] [0.496] [0.496]
R-squared 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.017
Note: Sample data is for observable and unobservable effort games only. Transfer promised refers
to the transfer promised when the participant receives high income and her partner receives low
income (conditional on effort in the Observable Effort Game). Any Transfers is a dummy for
whether the participants reached an agreement with any (non-zero amount of) transfers promised.
Completed Task is a dummy for whether the participant correctly answered 45 grids on the count-
ing task. These regressions include individual fixed-effects (426 individuals, 832 observations for
Transfers Promised and Completed Task, 852 observations for Any Transfers Promised). Standard
errors are in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Same VE Group indicates whether a
participant speaks the same language and lives in the same village within Kibera as their partner
(mean 0.519). Partner Rel indicates whether a participant claims to know their partner outside the
experiment (mean of 0.252). Partner Rel Two Way indicates whether a participant claims to know
their partner outside the experiment and their partner claims to know them outside the experiment
(mean of 0.136).
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Table 1.5: The Subsample Who Reach a Contract with Any Transfers Promised
Panel A: Transfers Promised
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Same Partner Partner
VE Rel Rel
Group Two Way
Unobservable Effort Game (α1) 3.676 7.178 1.035 1.811
[2.888] [4.666] [3.460] [3.223]
Relationship (α2) −5.394 −12.19 −1.205
[7.201] [7.594] [9.378]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) −5.830 10.45 12.66
[6.518] [7.763] [10.878]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 −11.223 −1.738 11.46
Std. Dev.: α2 + α3 [7.251] [7.689] [8.336]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 1.348 11.487∗ 14.476
Std. Dev.: α1 + α3 [4.063] [6.521] [9.902]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 37.952 22.127 27.525 27.003
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev. [36.889] [27.629] [35.326] [35.382]
R-squared 0.007 0.018 0.021 0.017
Panel B: Completed Task
Unobservable Effort Game (α1) −0.027 −0.029 −0.027 −0.048
[0.036] [0.058] [0.043] [0.040]
Relationship (α2) −0.091 0.070 0.068
[0.090] [0.095] [0.117]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) 0.008 0.000 0.122
[0.081] [0.097] [0.135]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 −0.084 0.070 0.190∗
Std. Dev.: α2 + α3 [0.906] [0.096] [0.104]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 −0.021 −0.026 0.074
Std. Dev.: α1 + α3 [0.051] [0.082] [0.123]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 0.562 0.564 0.569 0.564
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev. [0.497] [0.497] [0.496] [0.497]
R-squared 0.003 0.008 0.006 0.018
Note: These regressions include the sample of participants who reached a contract with any non-
zero amount of transfers promised with their partner. There are 329 individual fixed-effects and
548 observations. Standard errors are in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 1.6: The Effects of Imperfect Monitoring and Social Proximity - Without Fixed
Effects
Panel A: Any Transfers Promised
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Same Partner Partner
VE Rel Rel
Group Two Way
Unobservable Effort Game (α1) −0.047∗∗ −0.096∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
[0.024] [0.037] [0.026] [0.024]
Relationship (α2) −0.050 0.010 −0.056
[0.053] [0.051] [0.065]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) 0.094∗ 0.099 0.409∗∗∗
[0.054] [0.062] [0.079]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 0.043 0.109∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗
Std. Dev.: α2 + α3 [0.053] [0.053] [0.046]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 −0.002 0.028 0.310∗∗∗
Std. Dev.: α1 + α3 [0.035] [0.056] [0.075]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 0.685 0.692 0.685 0.696
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev. [0.465] [0.463] [0.465] [0.461]
R-squared 0.064 0.066 0.069 0.094
Panel B: Transfers Promised
Unobservable Effort Game (α1) −0.831 2.688 −2.298 −2.691
[2.057] [2.996] [2.386] [2.212]
Relationship (α2) 1.966 −6.928∗ −8.349∗
[4.365] [3.984] [4.711]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) −6.682 5.199 12.790∗
[4.434] [4.860] [7.461]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 −4.717 −1.728 4.443
Std. Dev.: α2 + α3 [4.578] [4.016] [6.385]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 −3.995 2.901 10.101
Std. Dev.: α1 + α3 [3.022] [4.186] [6.965]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 25.800 22.127 27.525 27.003
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev. [35.190] [27.629] [35.326] [35.382]
R-squared 0.024 0.026 0.028 0.028
Continues Onto the Next Page...
39
Panel C: Completed Task
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Same Partner Partner
VE Rel Rel
Group Two Way
Unobservable Effort Game (α1) 0.048∗ 0.033 0.044 0.020
[0.026] [0.040] [0.033] [0.030]
Relationship (α2) −0.013 −0.116∗∗ −0.169∗∗
[0.061] [0.057] [0.068]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) 0.028 0.003 0.182∗∗
[0.058] [0.068] [0.093]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 0.015 −0.114∗∗ 0.013
Std. Dev.: α2 + α3 [0.058] [0.058] [0.075]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 0.061 0.047 0.202∗∗
Std. Dev.: α1 + α3 [0.038] [0.054] [0.081]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 0.537 0.564 0.569 0.564
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev [0.499] [0.497] [0.496] [0.496]
R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.036 0.033
Note: Sample data is for observable and unobservable effort games only. These regressions include
individual fixed-effects (426 individuals, 832 observations for Transfers Promised and Completed
Task, 852 observations for Any Transfers Promised). Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level and are in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Same VE Group indicates whether
a participant speaks the same language and lives in the same village within Kibera as their partner
(mean 0.519). Partner Rel indicates whether a participant claims to know their partner outside the
experiment (mean of 0.252). Partner Rel Two Way indicates whether a participant claims to know
their partner outside the experiment and their partner claims to know them outside the experiment
(mean of 0.136).
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Table 1.7: The Effects of Imperfect Monitoring for the Counting Task with Lower Threshold (of 20 Correct Answers)
Any Transfers Promised Transfers Promised
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Same Partner Partner All Same Partner Partner
VE Rel Rel VE Rel Rel
Group Two Way Two Way Group Two Way Two Way
Unobs Effort Game (α1) −0.044 −0.054 −0.029 −0.052 0.929 −0.558 −0.985 −1.255
[0.031] [0.035] [0.037] [0.035] [2.780] [3.165] [3.109] [2.929]
Relationship (α2) −0.062 0.198∗∗ 0.058 −6.718 15.840∗∗ 13.630
[0.082] [0.089] [0.105] [7.443] [7.528] [8.783]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) 0.040 −0.065 0.078 7.757 1.538 5.544
[0.106] [0.093] [0.158] [9.594] [7.887] [13.249]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 −0.022 0.132 0.135 1.039 17.377∗∗ 19.176∗
Std. Dev.: α2 + α3 [0.103] [0.097] [0.128] [9.392] [8.191] [10.779]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 −0.015 −0.094 0.026 7.199 0.554 4.289
Std. Dev.: α1 + α3 [0.096] [0.082] [0.148] [8.697] [6.918] [12.448]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 0.690 0.728 0.683 0.685 15.265 17.111 13.043 13.533
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev. [0.463] [0.466] [0.467] [0.466] [37.442] [40.105] [36.760] [36.094]
Observations 452 452 412 412 452 452 412 412
R-squared 0.009 0.012 0.035 0.017 0.000 0.005 0.030 0.026
Note: These regressions include individual fixed-effects (372 individuals). Standard errors in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. For this
sample 20 correct answers were required for favorable probabilities of high income. Same VE indicates whether a participant speaks the same language
and lives in the same village in Kibera as their partner (mean 0.159). Partner Rel indicates whether a participant claims to know their partner outside the
experiment (mean of 0.197). Partner Rel Two Way indicates whether a participant claims to know their partner outside the experiment and their partner
claims to know them outside the experiment (mean of 0.087).
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Table 1.8: With Alternative Transfer Promised for the Observable Effort game
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Same Partner Partner
VE Rel Rel
Group Two Way
Unobs Effort Game (α1) −8.615∗∗∗ −6.465∗∗ −10.090∗∗∗ −9.605∗∗∗
[2.056] [3.138] [2.482] [2.301]
Relationship (α2) 3.229 0.048 2.221
[5.333] [5.343] [5.930]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) −4.102 6.088 8.623
[4.560] [5.502] [7.634]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 −0.873 6.136 10.844∗
Std. Dev: α2 + α3 [5.326] [5.494] [6.347]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 −10.567∗∗∗ −3.998 −0.982
Std. Dev: α1 + α3 [3.011] [4.603] [6.921]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 33.181 28.631 33.535 33.687
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev. [37.583] [30.360] [37.539] [37.789]
Observations 852 852 852 852
R-squared 0.04 0.042 0.043 0.046
Note: These regressions include individual fixed-effects (426 individuals). Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level and are in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. In these
regressions, transfer promised refers to the transfer promised when the participant receives high
income and their partner receives low income. In the Observable Effort Game I use the highest
transfer promised among the potential combinations of effort. Same VE Group indicates whether
a participant speaks the same language and lives in the same village within Kibera as their partner
(mean 0.519). Partner Rel indicates whether a participant claims to know their partner outside the
experiment (mean of 0.252). Partner Rel Two Way indicates whether a participant claims to know
their partner outside the experiment and their partner claims to know them outside the experiment
(mean of 0.136).
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Table 1.9: Subsample of Participants for Whom Completion of the Task Is Achievable
Panel A: Any Transfers Promised
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Same Partner Partner
VE Rel Rel
Group Two Way
Unobservable Effort Game (α1) −0.125∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗
[0.043] [0.064] [0.046] [0.045]
Relationship (α2) 0.047 0.147 0.109
[0.124] [0.128] [0.144]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) 0.018 0.328∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗
[0.093] [0.124] [0.168]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 0.065 0.474∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗
Std. Dev.: α2 + α3 [0.124] [0.138] [0.143]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 −0.116∗ 0.156 0.241
Std. Dev.: α1 + α3 [0.064] [0.111] [0.157]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 0.719 0.719 0.721 0.721
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev. [0.451] [0.453] [0.450] [0.450]
R-squared 0.062 0.065 0.15 0.151
Panel B: Transfers Promised
Unobservable Effort Game (α1) −10.170∗∗∗ −3.296 −9.954∗∗ −9.510∗∗
[3.424] [5.266] [3.903] [3.719]
Relationship (α2) 14.11 7.721 18.310
[9.460] [10.636] [11.450]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) −12.670∗ −0.112 −5.985
[7.416] [10.082] [13.466]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 1.441 7.609 12.320
Std. Dev.: α2 + α3 [9.460] [11.230] [12.320]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 −15.970∗∗∗−10.066 −15.496
Std. Dev.: α1 + α3 [4.803] [8.954] [12.459]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 30 20.833 29.263 29.095
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev. [35.058] [24.948] [34.564] [34.375]
R-squared 0.07 0.099 0.075 0.093
Continues Onto the Next Page...
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Panel C: Completed Task
Unobservable Effort Game (α1) 0.034 0.027 0.010 0.019
[0.040] [0.062] [0.045] [0.044]
Relationship (α2) 0.049 −0.114 −0.132
[0.112] [0.123] [0.134]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) 0.013 0.124 0.140
[0.087] [0.117] [0.158]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 0.062 0.010 0.008
Std. Dev.: α2 + α3 [0.112] [0.131] [0.134]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 0.040 0.134 0.159
Std. Dev.: α1 + α3 [0.057] [0.104] [0.146]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 0.831 0.815 0.832 0.838
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev [0.377] [0.392] [0.376] [0.370]
R-squared 0.006 0.009 0.018 0.016
Note: These regressions include individual fixed-effects with 128 individuals (256 observations
for Any Transfers Promised, 246 for Transfers Promised and Completed Task). Standard errors
are in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 1.10: Characteristics of Social Connections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Same Village-Ethnic Partner Partner Relationship
Group Relationship Two Way
Believes Partner Completed Task −0.145∗ −0.015 0.026 0.059 0.054 0.075∗∗
[0.078] [0.051] [0.061] [0.044] [0.047] [0.034]
Belief Partner Completed Task Correct 0.040 0.035 −0.006 −0.008 −0.051 −0.030
[0.080] [0.051] [0.063] [0.044] [0.048] [0.034]
Index Knowledge Partner −0.344 −0.302 −0.244∗
[0.243] [0.192] [0.146]
Constant 0.762∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
[0.164] [0.046] [0.129] [0.039] [0.099] [0.030]
Observations 169 406 169 406 169 406
R-squared 0.032 0.001 0.016 0.004 0.029 0.013
Notes: Sample data is for the Unobservable Effort game. Standard errors are in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Believes Partner Completed Task (mean 0.556) indicates whether a participant guessed that their partner completed the task
in the Unobservable Effort game and Belief Partner Completed Task Correct(mean 0.594) indicates whether the guess was
correct. “Index Knowledge Partner” is an index, ranging from 0 to 1 (mean 0.616), of how well a participant knows their
partner based on the number of questions about the partner that was answered correctly.
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CHAPTER 2
Motives to Share: Evidence from a Risk Sharing
Experiment in Kenya
Informal transfers are widely used by poor households in developing countries. I examine these
transfers using a laboratory experiment with residents from the slums of Nairobi. The experiment
is designed to study informal risk sharing, but a variety of other motives may have an effect on
sharing in the experiment. Using the pattern of transfers in the experiment, this paper compares
the relative importance of social preferences, specifically altruism and inequality aversion, social
proximity, bargaining weights, and heterogeneity in risk preferences. I find that altruism, measured




Poor households in developing countries commonly use informal transfers of money and gifts (Plat-
teau and Abraham, 1987; Udry, 1994). These informal transfers exhibit features consistent with
informal risk sharing (Fafchamps, 1999; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), allowing households to share
risk and smooth consumption against income variation. However, these transfers also occur due to a
variety of other motives, such as altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001;
Ligon and Schechter, 2012; Leider et al. 2009), inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), social ties corresponding to social pressure (Goldberg, 2013; Dellavi-
gna et al, 2012) or increased altruism (Ligon and Schechter, 2012; Leider et al. 2009; Fafchamps,
2011). Additionally, risk preferences (Mazzocco and Saini, 2012) and relative bargaining weights
(Mazzocco and Saini, 2012; Townsend, 1994) may have important effects on transfers.
This paper examines these motives for sharing in the presence of informal risk sharing. I im-
plement a laboratory experiment with residents of slums in Nairobi that allows participants to share
risk. Most participants promise transfers only when there is inequality in incomes, consistent with
risk sharing. However, the pattern of transfers suggests that other factors also play a role. Specifi-
cally, I examine how altruism, tolerance for inequality, social ties, heterogeneity in risk preferences,
bargaining weights and gender affect the pattern of transfers in the experiment using survey mea-
sures. I find that altruism best fits the pattern of transfers.
The artefactual field experiment is conducted with residents of a large slum, a population facing
low and variable income and familiar with informal insurance, which provides an appropriate con-
text for the experiment. In the risk sharing game, participants receive either a high or low income.
Each participant’s probability of high income depends on luck. Participants first negotiate an ex ante
binding insurance agreement with their partner. Transfers between participants can depend on in-
come. Although neoclassical risk sharing predicts only symmetric transfers when there is inequality
in incomes, I find that 27% of contracts with transfers do not fit this pattern.
I build a model of altruism in risk sharing to find that altruistic participants should be more
likely to risk share; participants differing in altruism should be more likely to make transfers when
both individuals receive the same income and to promise more transfers when there is inequality in
incomes. I examine the predictions of the model using data from a laboratory experiment. I find
that altruism, measured as behavior in an anonymous dictator game, predicts the pattern of transfers
in the risk sharing games relatively well. Specifically, altruistic participants are 60% more likely
to risk share. Relative altruism, specifically when a partner is altruistic, corresponds to a 156%
increase in transfers promised when both participants receive the same income.
Next, I examine whether social proximity, measured as the relationship between participants,
has an effect on sharing in the experiment. If social proximity corresponds to higher overall levels
of altruism or increased social pressure to cooperate, then socially connected individuals should be
more likely to risk share. I do not find support for this, as socially connected individuals do not risk
share differently than unconnected individuals.
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I then examine whether bargaining weights, determined by external factors such as education,
relative social standing, or wealth, affect sharing in the experiment. I also do not find support for
the view that individuals with presumably higher bargaining weights benefit more from sharing in
the experiment.
Using a survey measure of tolerance for inequality, I examine whether inequality aversion has
an effect on sharing in the experiment. Preferences for equality should correspond to increased
sharing in the experiment, specifically when there is inequality in income. I find little support that
tolerance for inequality corresponds to sharing in the experiment and the pattern of transfers.
Given evidence that women and men may share differently, I examine whether there is an effect
of gender and gender pairing in my experiment. I find that men promise higher transfers than
women. However, I do not find gender differences in likelihood of sharing.
2.2 Experiment Design and Context
2.2.1 Experiment Design
The experiment was conducted March-June 2015 at the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics
in Nairobi, Kenya. The experiment consists of 41 sessions lasting approximately 3 hours with 676
participants.1 During each session, participants play a partner game on a touch-screen computer,
conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions are provided orally by trained full-time
laboratory assistants who read from a script in both English and Swahili, as well as written in En-
glish. In order to ensure comprehension, participant knowledge is verified through periodic quizzes
during the session.
All participants play a series of risk sharing games with partners. In this paper, I focus solely
on one of the games, the Risk Only game, which includes only risky income.2 Participants are
randomly matched with partners. The order of the risk sharing games is randomized across sessions
and participants are paid for the decisions made in one of the three games. Given that there is risky
income and a single game is randomly chosen for payment, risk averse participants should attempt
to smooth consumption to decrease the variability of a one-shot lottery payment.
The average payout is greater than the average daily wage in the slum.3 There are two payment
schemes used.4 I vary the stakes to ensure that the results are robust over increasing financial
1A detailed summary of the sessions is provided in Appendix Table D.1.
2Jain (2016) describes and studies the other risk sharing games.
3Potential subjects were invited via SMS text message. Participants are compensated with 200 KSH in
cash (with an additional 50 KSH for arriving to the session on time) to allay transportation and opportunity
costs they may incur in attending the session. Those that are turned away from the session due to limitations
on capacity are paid the cash show-up fee. Four participants were removed during the sessions; their data is
dropped from all results shown.
4Detailed game scripts are available in Appendix A. I additionally provide examples of contracts to aid
with comprehension in the payment scheme 2 script; the scripts for payment scheme 2 and survey scripts are
available on my website. Since I focus on the Risk Only game, I pool data from sessions that vary in the
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stakes. In payment scheme 1, 508 participants begin with an endowment of 350 Kenyan shillings
(KSH, approximately $3.49 USD).5 If participants receive a high income shock (H), they gain 100
KSH and if they receive a low income shock (L), they lose 100 KSH. In payment scheme 2, 168
participants begin with an endowment of 250 KSH. If they receive a high income shock, they gain
400 KSH and if they receive a low income shock then they do not receive any additional money, 0
KSH. A post-experiment phone survey of a subset of participants indicates that 82% of participants
are risk averse over these stakes.6
In the Risk Only game, each participant faces a 75% chance of receiving a high income shock
(H) and a 25% chance of receiving a low income shock (L). Income is independently distributed
and observable. Before income is determined, each participant communicates face-to-face with
her partner to negotiate a contract that specifies what transfers she is willing to give or receive.7
The contract specifies the promise for each possible combination of incomes realizations (the set
of possible income realizations are {H,H}, {H,L}, {L,H}, {L,L} where the first entry denotes
the income of a participant and the second entry denotes of the income of her partner). Participants
cannot both give and receive a transfer in a given combination of income realizations. I put no
restrictions on either the direction or symmetry of the promised transfers in the contracts.8 If partic-
ipants do not agree on a contract, no transfers are made.9 Then, income is determined and transfers
are made based on the transfers promised. Realized income and transfers are not announced until
the end of the session, after all games have been played and participants have completed the survey.
After the risk sharing games are played, participants partake in an anonymous dictator game.
number of correct answers required to complete the task, which affects the other risk sharing games, payment
scheme and game order.
5Busara requires that participants receive at least 300 KSH (daily wage in the slum is 350 KSH as esti-
mated by Haushofer et al., 2014) and so the endowment was set to satisfy that restriction.
6I give participants the same stakes as in the experiment (either 450 or 650 KSH) and ask them to choose
how to divide the money between two envelopes, where one will be randomly chosen for payment. Partic-
ipants are classified as risk averse if they choose to divide the money equally between two envelopes (40%
participants). Allowing for arithmetic errors, 82% of participants split the money almost equally between the
two envelopes.
7Risk sharing outside the laboratory occurs in non-anonymous, face-to-face interactions, I design the
experiment with face-to-face communication to frame the experiment in the relevant context; in addition, it
allows illiterate individuals to participate in the experiment. A drawback is that I cannot control the bargaining
process; although I do not measure what happens during this stage, I do ask questions about what is discussed
after the experiment.
8Participants are given a worksheet to aid them as they negotiate the contract with their partner. A copy
of this worksheet can be found in Appendix B for payment scheme 1.
9Participants are given unlimited time to discuss the contracts. Participants take on average 7.7 minutes
to negotiate a contract. Then, participants are asked if they agreed on a contract with their partner on their
computers. In practice, over 95% of participants reach an agreement on a contract, including contracts in
which they specify no transfers promised. If both participants agree, then they enter the contracts into the
computer. If the contracts entered do not match their partner’s entry (i.e. if a participant enters “I give 100
KSH”, her partner must enter “I receive 100 KSH”), then the program provides an additional opportunity
to enter the contract. The requirement that the contracts entered must match is to prevent manipulation. If
contracts still do not match, then no transfers are made. This is known to participants in advance and occurs
for 4.2% of partnerships in the Risk Only game.
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Then, they answer survey questions about themselves, their partner, informal transfers made outside
of the laboratory, and their values. Finally, participants receive a phone survey in July-August 2015.
Participants receive additional income for choices made in the surveys.10
All participants are paid within two days of the experiment via M-PESA, a mobile-phone based
money transfer service. The average payment is 489 KSH (approximately $4.90 USD) with a stan-
dard deviation of 136 KSH (minimum of 179 KSH and maximum of 840 KSH), in addition to the
show-up fee. The self-reported daily wage is around 350 KSH (based on data from 2011, Haushofer
et al., 2014); thus the stakes in the experiment are meaningful to the participants involved. Since I
choose to implement the outcome from a randomly chosen game for payment and payment is sent
through M-PESA, it is unlikely that participants use transfers after the experiment to share.
2.2.2 Context
To conduct my experiment, I select my participants from Kibera, one of the largest informal set-
tlements (slums) in Africa. Thus, this is an artefactual field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004)
with elements to frame the experiment in the relevant context. Kibera is situated 5 kilometers from
the Nairobi city center and 2 kilometers from experimental site. In Kibera, 42% of households fall
below the poverty line of $2 a day (Marx et al., 2015). Estimates of the population in Kibera range
from 170,000 (2009 official census) to over 1 million (unofficial sources). The settlement is divided
into 9 smaller villages.
To participate in the experiment, participants must be at least 18 years and have access to a cell
phone and M-PESA.11 The summary statistics of participants in Table 2.1 show that participants
are somewhat comparable to the typical resident of Kibera. Since participants must be available to
attend the experiment during the workweek, my participants are more likely to be female. Given
that Marx et al. (2015) find that residents of Kibera are more likely to have some secondary ed-
ucation (42%) and are more likely to be Luo, Luhya, or Kamba (35%, 27%, 15% respectively)
than the rest of Kenya, my participants are comparable to residents of Kibera in both education
and ethnic makeup. The average participant in my experiment has been involved in 3.56 other
studies since 2012, when Busara was founded. All participants for payment scheme 2 were newly
recruited. Thus, participants in my experiment are not familiar with economic experiments and are
representative of a typical slum resident.
Households frequently face income variation. The survey responses show that 64% of partici-
pants perceive their household income in the past year to be well below or below average. Further-
more, 31% of participants report that they primarily work for themselves, 33% report that cannot
find work, and 44% of participants report that they primarily work once in a while. In addition, 86%
10Participants are paid for a choice in an anonymous dictator game, for a choice between two lotteries, and
for answering a randomly-selected question about their partner correctly.
11Recent data collected in the Nairobi slums suggest that over 90% of residents have access to both a cell
phone and M-PESA (Marx et al., 2015). A detailed description of recruitment into the Busara subject pool is
provided in Haushofer et al. (2014).
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of participants indicate they have faced a household shock in the past 6 months, with 59% reporting
multiple shocks.12
Finally, participants use informal transfers. 31% (51%) of participants indicate they have re-
ceived (given) on average 2428 (2371) KSH in the past month. Therefore, the average payment
corresponds to approximate 20% of the amount shared by households who make transfers. 51%
(67%) of aid received (given) is to (from) the slum itself or Nairobi and typically takes the form of
money, food, or clothing. This should inform the interpretation of my results, since this is a popu-
lation that uses informal transfers and faces risk in their daily lives. Additionally, the experiment is
framed in the context of a merchant selling goods on the street, which is a relevant real-life example
for my participants.
However, this is not a framed field experiment due to features that do not govern risk sharing
outside of the lab, such as enforceable ex ante contracts, and the one shot nature of the interac-
tion. I argue that participants understand these features, since they frequently engage in institutions
with well-defined rules and regulations, such as Rotating Savings and Credits Associations (59%
use ROSCAs or Merry-Go-Rounds) and group-based funeral insurance (which is common in East
Africa as demonstrated in De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; Dercon et al., 2006). Thus, participants
are familiar with informal financial promises. Also, since 77% of participants indicate they have
discussed with family and friends what they might do if a bad shock were to occur, they are used to
thinking ahead financially.
2.3 Description of Sharing
A description of the contracts is presented in Table 2.2. Transfers are in units of Kenyan shillings
(approximately 100 KSH to $1 USD). “Transfer Promised HL” is the transfer promised when a
participant receives H and her partner receives L. A transfer with a negative value implies that the
transfer would be received and a positive value implies that the transfer would be given. Thus, a
transfer with a negative value in the {H,L} state implies that the transfer is given from the individual
receiving low income to the individual receiving high income. “Transfer Promised HH” (“Transfer
Promised LL”) is the absolute value of the transfer promised when both participants receive H
(L); without this absolute value, the means would be zero by construction. I display the summary
statistics separately for payment schemes 1 (H = 100, L = −100) and 2 (H = 400, L = 0).
Altogether I have a sample of 676 participants.
Transfers can be promised for numerous purposes in the Risk Only game. However, it is reas-
suring that transfers promised from the participant receiving low income to the participant receiving
high income are infrequent, occurring for just 6.2% of partnerships.
12These household shocks include weather related shocks, wedding or funeral expenses, eviction, loss of
job or decrease in work available, or illness that prevented a household member from working or required
medical expenses.
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In the Risk Only game, full risk sharing for a participant (partner) who receives income H (L)
corresponds to a transfer of 100 KSH in payment scheme 1 (H = 100, L = −100) and 200 KSH
in payment scheme 2 (H = 400, L = 0). With homogenous risk averse agents, there should be
no transfers made when both receive the same income. Table 2.2 Column (9) presents the rescaled
payment schemes so that full risk sharing corresponds to 100. I find that the average transfer in the
Risk Only game is only 23.8%. Figure 2.1 shows that very few (7.4%) participants promise transfers
at the level of full risk sharing. Among participants who make transfers, the average transfer amount
is 38.4%. Thus, transfers are far from the amount corresponding to full risk sharing.
Furthermore, only 68% of partnerships reach a contract with any transfers promised. Only 49%
of participants (73% of participants who promise transfers) reach a contract with transfers promised
such that the transfers promised in state {H,L} is equal that in state {L,H}, and no transfers
promised when both receive the same income. Therefore, the remaining 19% of participants promise
transfers that do not take the form predicted by a theory of risk sharing with homogenous risk averse
agents.
Transfers are commonly promised when both participants receive the same (high or low) in-
come; {H,H} and {L,L} transfers occur for 10.4% and 6.5% of the time respectively. In addition,
asymmetric transfers, in which the transfer promised when a participant receives high income and
her partner receives low income shock is not equal to the transfer promised when the roles are re-
versed, occur for 11.2% of pairs. As Figure 2.2 shows, these transfers are large, as {H,H} ({L,L})
transfers are 48% (44%) that of full risk sharing among those who promise these transfers. Among
those who make asymmetric transfers, transfers are 20.7% of full risk sharing. Thus, the prevalence
of these transfers suggests that the homogenous risk averse agent model of risk sharing is not ap-
propriate for a subset of participants, and that alternative motives for sharing may have an effect in
the experiment.
2.4 An Examination of Motives to Share
2.4.1 Altruism
2.4.1.1 Model
To provide intuition, I develop a model of altruism in risk sharing that generates testable predictions.
If either agent is altruistic, the model predicts that they are more likely to risk share. The relative
altruism between agents affects the level of risk sharing, i.e. transfers.
Suppose that there are two risk-averse agents, i ∈ {A,B}. These agents are endowed with
initial wealth ω and face income shocks, pi ∈ {H,L} where H > L. The probability of a high
income shock is p. In this model, agents are characterized by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function, which is assumed to be continuous, with a continuous derivative, strictly increasing and
concave in wealth. Income is independently distributed. Agents bargain to reach a contract of
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promised transfers that depends on income.
I model the problem as a benevolent planner with an ex ante utilitarian criterion. Therefore, I do
not model the bargaining process. Agents can choose no transfers promised and revert to autarky.
Agents may be altruistic and place weight αi on their partner’s utility (αi = 0 corresponds
to a selfish agent, αi > 0 corresponds to an altruistic agent). There are four potential transfers,
τ = {τHH , τHL, τLH , τLL}, defined as the transfer from agent A to agent B (where τij < 0 means
that agent B transfers money to agent A).
Agents may incur a bargaining cost, bi, (similar to the association costs proposed in Murgai
et al., 2002) in reaching a contract with transfers promised. As a result, some agents may choose
autarky.13
I define the problem as:
max
τ
[EUA (piA, τ ) + αAEUB (piB, τ )] + [EUB (piB, τ ) + αBEUA (piA, τ )] (2.1)
If τ > 0, then, for each agent i (and her partner −i), the following participation constraint (PC)
must hold:
EUi (pii, τ ) + αiEU−i (pi−i, τ )− bi ≥ EUi (pii, τ = 0) + αiEU−i (pi−i, τ = 0) (2.2)
I renormalize the bargaining weights, such that α = 1+αA1+αB . Now α = 1 if agents are equally
altruistic, and thus the benevolent planner places equal weight on each agent. If α > 0, then agentA
is relatively more altruistic and the benevolent principal places higher weight on agent B. If α < 0,
then agent B is relatively more altruistic and the benevolent principal places higher weight on agent
A. Now the problem is:
max
τ
EUA (piA, τ ) + αEUB (piB, τ ) =
p2 [U (H − τHH) + αU (H + τHH)] + p (1− p) [U (H − τHL) + αU (L+ τHL})]
+ (1− p) p [U (L− τLH) + αU (H + τLH)] + (1− p)2 [U (L− τLL) + αU (L+ τLL)]
For now, I use a stylized example to examine how altruism affects risk sharing. I assume an
isoelastic utility function, U(pi, e) = (ω+pi−τ)
1−ρ
1−ρ − c(e)− bi(τ) where ρ is the constant coefficient












. For each transfer, dτijdα > 0,
implying that transfers are increasing in the relative altruism. In addition, τij > 0 ∀α > 0 when
13Without the bargaining cost, risk averse agents should always promise transfers. This is not empirically
the case, as 32% of participants negotiate a contract with no transfers promised.
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bi = 0, implying that if agents differ in altruism then transfers should be promised for all possible
combinations of income. Thus, differences in altruism should predict transfers when both agents
receive the same income (income realization {H,H} and {L,L}), and asymmetric transfers.
Next, I focus on the participation constraint to examine whether altruism affects the likelihood
that participants engage in risk sharing. Given optimal transfers τ > 0 and b > 0, the PC is
more likely to hold for altruistic agents (αi > 0), since these agents consider the benefit of risk
sharing for both themselves and their partners whereas selfish agents only consider the benefit to
themselves. However, a less altruistic agent also benefits from risk sharing with an altruistic agent,
as they benefit from sharing beyond smoothing consumption (τHH > 0, τLL > 0, τHL > τLH if
agent B is less altruistic than agent A). Therefore, if either agent is altruistic (αi > 0), then agents
should be more likely to risk share.
2.4.1.2 Empirical Analysis
I measure participants’ altruism from an anonymous dictator game (as in Leider et al., 2009; Ligon
and Schechter, 2012). In the dictator game, participants choose how much of 100 KSH to share
(in increments of 10 KSH), without knowing whether they are chosen to offer or receive money in
the dictator game. Figure 2.3 shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in the amounts shared,
as 40% of participants give 0 KSH, 38% give between 10-40 KSH, and the remaining 22% give
between 50-100 KSH.
I code participants as altruistic if they give any amount of money to an anonymous partner in
this dictator game. My empirical strategy consists of regressions with the following form:
yij = α0 + α1Giveri + α2Giverj + α3Giveri ·Giverj + γij + ij
where i indexes the subject, j indexes the partner, γij is a vector representing game order, threshold
and payment controls. Giveri indicates whether the participant gives any amount of money in the
anonymous dictator game, Giverj indicates whether the partner gives any amount of money in the
anonymous dictator game, and yi denotes the outcomes of interest. Standard errors are clustered at
the session level.
I have four outcomes of interest, as motivated by the theory. One outcome of interest is the ex-
tensive margin of risk sharing, whether a contract with transfers promised is reached (“Any Transfers
Promised”). If no transfers are promised then participants are in autarky, as their partners’ realiza-
tions do not affect their take-home incomes. A second outcome of interest is a dummy that indicates
whether any transfers are promised when participants receive incomes {H,H} or {L,L} (“Any HH or
LL Transfers”). A third outcome of interest is a dummy that indicates whether asymmetric transfers
are promised, i.e. the transfer promised when a participant receives a high income and their partner
a low income is different than when their roles are reversed (“Any HL6=LH Transfers”). These first
three outcomes of interest describe contracts, which occur at the couple level, and so my analysis
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occurs at the couple level. My last outcome of interest is the level of risk sharing, measured as the
transfer promised if a participant receives high income and her partner receives low income (“Trans-
fers Promised”). For the analyses, I code the level of transfers relative to the amount corresponding
to full risk sharing. Since the transfer promised when a participant receives high income and her
partner receives low income can vary from when a participant receives low income and her partner
receives high income, this analysis occurs at the individual level.
Based on the theory, I expect that participants engage in more risk sharing if at least one par-
ticipant is altruistic, i.e. α1 > 0, α2 > 0, and α1 + α2 + α3 > 0. Relative altruism, when
only one of participants in the partnership is altruistic should have an effect on whether asymmetric
transfers or transfers when both participants receive the same income are promised relative to when
both participants are selfish (the omitted group) or both are altruistic, thus α1 > 0, α2 > 0, and
α1 + α2 + α3 = 0. Finally, an altruistic agent should promise higher transfers when they receive a
high income shock and their partner receives a low income shock, i.e. α1 > 0.
Consistent with the theory, the results in Table 2.3 Column (1) show that if either participant is
altruistic, participants are more likely to risk share (statistically significant at the 5% level or better).
The magnitudes are large - if a participant (partner) is altruistic, she is 60% (38%) more likely to
reach a contract with transfers promised. If both participants are altruistic, this corresponds to an
88% increase in the likelihood of risk sharing.
In addition, the results in Table 2.3 Column (2) show that relative altruism, in particular when
a partner is altruistic, predicts whether participants promise transfers when both receive a high or
low income. The effect corresponds to a 13.1 percentage point (156%) increase in the probability
of making a transfer when both receive high or low income, whereas only 7.2% of non-altruistic
participants promise these transfers. I do not find that a participant’s altruism has a statistically
significant effect, though the magnitude corresponds to a 74% effect. Consistent with the theory, I
do not find an effect when both agents are altruistic, as α1 + α2 + α3 is not statistically significant
from zero, though the coefficient corresponds to an 86% effect.
The results in Table 2.3 Column (3) show that relative altruism does not predict asymmetric
transfers, as α1, α2, α3 and α1 +α2 +α3 are not statistically different from zero. Since few (9.9%)
partnerships in which both participants are selfish make asymmetric transfers, the magnitudes are
non-trivial. Specifically, an altruistic participant is 40% more likely to promise an asymmetric
transfer and participants are 56% more likely to promise an asymmetric transfer when both are
altruistic.
Finally, I examine whether altruistic participants promise higher transfers when they receive
high income and their partner receives low income. Theoretically, an altruistic participant should
promise higher transfers. The results in Table 2.3 Column (4) find that α1 is not statistically signif-
icant, though the coefficient is positive.
Thus, I find support for the role of altruism in the experiment. Specifically, the results are con-
sistent with the predictions of the theory regarding the extensive margin of risk sharing. However,
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I find less support for the role of altruism on transfers. While I do find evidence that altruism can
explain transfers when both agents receive the same income, I find only weak evidence that altruism
can explain asymmetric transfers or the level of transfers.
2.4.2 Social Proximity
Social proximity may have an effect on sharing by decreasing the bargaining cost to sharing (Jain,
2016; or social pressure as in Dellavigna et al., 2012; Goldberg, 2013), or increasing altruism (Foster
and Rosenzweig, 2001; Leider et al., 2009; Ligon and Schechter, 2012; Fafchamps, 2011).
To examine the role of social proximity, I examine whether participants who have a relationship
with their partner exhibit a different pattern of transfers than participants with no relationship with
their partner. If social connections correspond to increased pressure to cooperate, a lower cost of
bargaining, or higher levels of altruism towards one another, then socially connected participants
should be more likely to risk share. If socially connected individuals are similarly altruistic towards
each other, then there should be no effect on the pattern of transfers.
I issue invitations by village and ethnic group within Kibera, resulting in natural variation in
social proximity in the experiment. The first measure of social proximity is a dummy for whether
the participant lives in the same village in Kibera and belongs to the same ethnic group as their
partner (“Same VE Group”), created from laboratory records. By this measure, 36% of participants
live in the same village and speak the same language as their partner.
The remaining measures of social proximity are taken from the survey responses, in which
participants describe their relationship with their partners (adapted from Banerjee et al., 2013).14
“Partner Rel” is a dummy that indicates whether a participant does not choose “I do not know this
person.” In my study, 40% of participants fall into this category, while 18% fall into the two-way
category (“Partnership Rel - Two Way”).
Given the above measures of social proximity, my empirical strategy consists of regressions
with the following form:
yij = α0 + α1relationshipij + γij + ij
where i indexes the subject, j indexes the partner, γij is a vector representing game order, threshold
and payment controls, relationshipij is one of the three measures for social proximity, and yi
denotes the outcomes of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the session level.
The results in Table 2.4 show no statistically significant effects of any of the social proximity
measures, either on the likelihood of risk sharing (Panel A), or the pattern of transfers (Panel B-Panel
14 1. He/she visits my home or I visit his/her home, 2. He/she is my kin or family, 3. He/she is not a
relative with whom I socialize, 4. I would borrow or lend money from him/her, 5. I would borrow or lend
material goods (such as food, coal, etc) from him/her, 6. I get or give advice from him/her, 7. I pray (at a
temple, church or mosque) with him or her, 8. I work with him/her, 9. I know this person but do not do any
of the previous activities with him/her, and 10. I do not know this person.
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D). If anything, the magnitudes suggest that social proximity may have an effect on asymmetric
transfers, which is not predicted by a model in which social proximity corresponds to increased but
similar altruism. Therefore, there is no evidence that social proximity has a role on sharing in the
experiment.
2.4.3 Pareto Weights
The benevolent planner may place different social marginal welfare weights on participants; equiv-
alently, there may be different bargaining weights, determined by external factors, that influence
the allocation of resources in the game (Mazzocco and Saini, 2012; Browning et al, 2011; Bobonis,
2009; Townsend, 1994; Manser and Brown, 1980). As a result, it may not be optimal for participants
to share income equally.
In practice, this is essentially the same maximization problem as in the case of altruism:
max
τ
EUA (piA, τ ) + αEUB (piB, τ ) (2.3)
In contrast to the case with altruism, the weights do not affect each agent’s participation constraint:
EUi (pii, τ )− b ≥ EUi (pii, τ = 0) (2.4)
Thus the implications from the theory of altruism regarding the pattern of transfers should hold.
Relative differences in weights should have an effect on whether asymmetric transfers or transfers
when both participants receive the same income are promised relative to when both participants
have similar weights, i.e. α1 > 0, α2 > 0, and α1 + α2 + α3 = 0. Finally, the agent with a higher
weight should promise fewer transfers when they receive a high income shock and their partner
receives a low income shock, i.e. α1 < 0.
However, it is not clear what factors affect relative bargaining weights in risk sharing. Townsend
(1994) suggests that household Pareto weights are related to the wealth of the household. I mea-
sure the wealth indirectly by asking participants a series of questions regarding the assets in their
household to generate an asset index that weighs each component equally. The mean score on the
asset index is 0.351, with the median participant’s household having two of the following items: TV,
refrigerator, bike, vehicle, and electricity. Social standing may also be related to the Pareto weight,
which I measure as whether participants respond that their partner has higher, equal or lower so-
cial standing.15 67% of participants report that they have the same social standing as their partner.
Lastly, I consider education, which may also affect bargaining weights. I measure whether partici-
pants report that they have primary school education. 35% of participants report that their highest
level of education attained is some primary school; recall that most participants have secondary
15This questions are asked for a randomly selected partner from the three partners that participants interact
with in each experimental session. Therefore, the sample decreases with inclusion of this variable.
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school education.
The results in Table 2.5 Column (1) show that differences in social standing (α3) corresponds to
statistically and economically significant differences (at the 10% level or better) in the likelihood of
risk sharing, the presence of transfers when both participants receive the same income, asymmetric
transfers, and the level of risk sharing. However, differences in assets and education (Columns (2)
and (3)) do not correspond to increased sharing (Panel A and D) or the pattern of transfers (Panel
B and C); the effects are not statistically significant and are relatively small in magnitude. There is
some evidence that increased social standing, wealth, or primary education have effects overall on
the pattern of transfers, as α1 or α2 are sometimes statistically different from zero. However, my
theory cannot speak to this result.
2.4.4 Inequality Aversion
Inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Engelmann and Strobel,
2004) has been proposed as an explanation for the high levels of sharing observed in dictator and
ultimatum games.
If individuals are inequality averse, their utility may take the following form (as proposed by
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999):
Ui (x) = xi − αi max [xj − xi, 0]− βi max [xj − xi, 0]
where the second term measures the loss from disadvantageous inequality and the third term mea-
sures the loss from advantageous inequality. In the context of this experiment, inequality aversion
should result in the same pattern of transfers as risk sharing with homogenous risk averse prefer-
ences, i.e. τHH = τLL = 0 and τHL = τLH = 100, where 100 is the amount corresponding to full
risk sharing, so that participants receive the same income as their partner for all four combinations
of incomes.
Thus, preference for equality should correspond to increased sharing, both in the likelihood and
level of transfers. Preferences for equality should correspond to a lower likelihood of transfers when
both participants receive the same income and asymmetric transfers.
To examine whether inequality aversion plays a role in the experiment, I measure tolerance for
inequality as whether a participant agrees with the statement “it is acceptable for two primary school
teachers to earn different salaries if one was a more reliable worker whose students performed better
on standardized tests” (taken from Jakiela, 2015, 43% of participants agree with this statement).
Since the variable is defined as tolerance for inequality, the coefficients should have the opposite
sign as the hypotheses above, i.e. α1, α2, α1+α2+α3 > 0 in Columns (2) and (3) and α1, α2, α1+
α2 + α3 < 0 in Columns (1) and (4).
The results in Table 2.6 show that preference for equality does not increase risk sharing (Columns
(1) and (4)), since participants who tolerate inequality are not significantly less likely to risk share
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than participants who do not tolerate inequality; if anything, the signs suggest that risk sharing in-
creases when both participants tolerate inequality. I find some support that participants who tolerate
inequality are more likely to make asymmetric transfers (Column (3)). Specifically, a participant
who tolerates inequality is 10.9 percentage points (statistically significant at the 10% level, 133%)
more likely to promise asymmetric transfers when one participant receives high income and their
partner low income. Finally, Column (2) shows that tolerance for inequality is not significantly
correlated (economically or statistically) with the likelihood of promising transfers when both par-
ticipants receive the same income. Thus, I conclude that I find little support that tolerance for
equality corresponds to sharing in the experiment.
2.4.5 Risk Preferences
If I relax the assumption of homogenous risk averse agents to allow agents to differ in preference
for risk, then agents may promise transfers to their partner when both receive the same income, or
promise asymmetric transfers (Mazzocco and Saini, 2012). The intuition is that risk averse agents
reap larger gains from risk sharing than risk loving agents; to convince risk loving agents to risk
share, the risk averse agent should compensate risk loving agents with transfers when they both
receive a high income shock. If both agents are risk loving, then they should not risk share; lastly,
if both agents are risk averse, they should risk share.
To test whether differences in risk preferences can explain the pattern of transfers in the exper-
iment, I use various methods to measure participants’ risk preferences. First, I implement a phone
survey months after the experiment and ask them to divide money between two envelopes, where
one will randomly be chosen for payment. Risk averse individuals should divide the money equally
between the two envelopes. 82% of participants divide the money almost equally between the two
envelopes. Second, I code 58% of participants as relatively risk averse if they prefer a 50-50%
lottery of 1000-800 to a 50-50% lottery of 2000-100 credits (100 credits correspond to 1 KSH).
Finally, I ask participants whether they have gambled, entered a charity sweepstakes, or bought into
a lottery in the past three months. I code 80% of participants as risk averse if they have not gambled
in the past three months.
The results in Table 2.7 Panel A and Panel D shows no correlation between all three measures
of risk aversion and both the level and likelihood of risk sharing. I do find that participants’ risk
aversion corresponds to higher levels and likelihood of risk sharing; however this effect is not sta-
tistically significant from zero. This result suggests that my measures of risk averse are suspect, and
that perhaps the remaining results should be interpreted with caution.
Differences in risk aversion should correspond to a higher likelihood of transfers when both
receive the same income and asymmetric transfers. The results in Table 2.7 Panel B and Panel C
show that participants differing in risk aversion are not significantly more likely to promise these
transfers. In addition, the sign of the coefficients differ across measures of risk aversion. Thus, I
conclude that heterogeneity in risk aversion cannot explain the pattern of transfers.
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2.4.6 Gender
There is mixed evidence of differences in economic decisions by gender. If anything, there are no
systematic differences in the play of women and men in settings where subjects are exposed to risk
(Eckel and Grossman, 2008), which is the case in my experiment. In this section, I examine whether
sharing in the game is different by gender.
Given evidence that women are more risk averse (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Eckel and Gross-
man, 2002), women should exhibit greater demand for consumption smoothing and thus should be
more likely to risk share in the experiment.16 In addition, there is evidence of robust gender differ-
ences in social preferences, preferences for competition (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), and bargaining
(Castillo et al., 2013; Leibbrandt and List, 2014; Sutter et al. 2009; Walters et al., 1998), which
may play a role in the experiment. Lastly, women may also face more social pressure to share than
men (Jakiela and Ozier, 2016; Robinson, 2012; Anderson and Baland, 2002). Thus, it is worth
examining how both gender and gender pairings affect risk sharing in the experiment.
In the experiment, participants are randomly matched with partners, resulting in natural varia-
tion in gender pairings. My empirical strategy consists of regressions with the following form:
yij = α0 + α1 ·malei + α2 ·malej + α3 ·malei ·malej + γij + ij
where i indexes the subject, j indexes the partner, γij is a vector representing game order, threshold
and payment controls, malei indicates whether the participant is male, malej indicates whether the
partner is male, and yi denotes the outcomes of interest. Standard errors are clustered at the session
level.
The results in Table 2.8 Column (1) show statistically insignificant effects of gender on whether
participants risk share. However, the effects are substantively meaningful - for each male in the
partnership, there is a 6% increase (approximately 4 percentage points) in the likelihood of reaching
a contract. Table 2.8 Column (2) shows that male participants promise 33% higher transfers (statis-
tically significant at the 10% level). Although not statistically significant, there is also a 32% effect
of having a male partner on the level of transfers. Thus, although I do not find gender differences
in the likelihood of risk sharing, I find some evidence that men transfer more than women; as a
result, partnerships comprised of two men promise 61% higher transfers than partnerships with two
women (statistically significant at the 10% level).
16In my experiment, women and men are different (statistically significant at the 10% level) in their like-
lihood of gambling. 82.5% of women do not gamble, while 73% of men gamble. In contrast, I do not
find statistically significant differences in risk aversion by gender for the other measures of risk aversion; if
anything, the measures reflect that men are more risk averse than women.
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2.5 Transfers Outside the Laboratory
A critical issue that influences the interpretation of the results from laboratory experiments such as
mine is generalizability. The benefit of a laboratory experiment is that I can control the environment
to examine sharing in the absence of information asymmetries and with enforceable contracts, which
are otherwise difficult to obtain. However, there is evidence that behavior in an experiment is
influenced not simply by economic incentives, but also features of the experiment (Levitt and List,
2007). Despite this, a number of studies (Henrich et al. 2003; Ligon and Schechter, 2012) find
that differences in behaviors in economic games correspond to behavioral variation in or across
societies.
In this section, I examine whether sharing within the frame of the experiment is correlated with
sharing outside the experiment. I measure whether participants share outside the experiment by
whether they report that they lend money or personal possessions to others fairly often, very often,
or all the time (62% of participants). The results in Table 2.9 show little support for the hypothesis
that individuals who lend outside the experiment are more likely to risk share within the experiment.
Specifically, I do not find that participants (or partners) who make transfers outside the laboratory
are more likely to engage in risk sharing, promise transfers when both participants receive the same
income, promise asymmetric transfers, or engage in higher levels of risk sharing (at 10% statistical
significance).
Since I have chosen a context in which participants are presumably familiar with informal trans-
fers, even if they do not frequently use them, this does not necessarily undermine the generalizability
of the experiment. However, these results do suggest that future work should focus on sharing in
naturally occurring environments or focus on the link between sharing in experiments and sharing
in the field.
2.6 Conclusion
This study examines the role of social preferences, risk preferences, and bargaining weights in
the context of risk sharing using a laboratory experiment implemented in Kenya. Specifically, I
examine which motive for sharing can best explain the pattern of transfers in the games, since 19%
of all contracts do not fit the pattern predicted by a model of risk sharing with homogenous risk
averse agents.
My findings show that altruism best fits the pattern of the data. Specifically, altruistic partici-
pants are 60% more likely to engage in risk sharing. In addition, differences in altruism correspond
to an increased likelihood of transfers promised when both participants receive the same income.
Using the implications of theories of heterogeneous risk preferences, social ties, inequality aver-
sion, and bargaining weights, with data collected from a survey of participants, I find that these other
motives cannot explain the pattern of transfers. Socially connected individuals do not exhibit a dif-
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ferent pattern of transfers, or increased risk sharing than unconnected individuals. Sharing in the
experiment, more importantly transfers that cannot be reconciled with neoclassical risk sharing, are
not related to participants’ education, relative social standing, or wealth. Lastly, differences in risk
preferences cannot explain the pattern of transfers.
Why people share is a critically important question for understanding the effect of policies with
the aim of improving household welfare and intravillage sharing. For example, programs such as
Progresa that target the poor have important spillovers on nonpoor households; understanding the
motives for sharing can help policymakers design efficient programs. My paper shows that sharing
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Subject Pool
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nairobi/Kenya Busara Subjects Experiment Range
Age (years) 31.34 33.09 19-65
Male (%) 51.15 ∗ 45.47 38.72
Education (%)
Some Primary 36.95 ∗ 47.81 35.06
Some Secondary 32.30 ∗ 39.99 49.99
Some College or University 19.13 ∗ 9.05 12.43
Native Language (%)
Luhya 13.83 19.47 33.88
Luo 10.48 19.16 30.46
Kikuyu 17.15 25.04 9.21
Other 58.54 36.33 26.45
Married (%)
Single 19.74 47.79 43.83
Married or Cohabiting 71.17 44.84 47.40
Divorced, separated, widowed 9.08 7.37 8.77
Other Sessions Attended 3.56 0-14
Notes: 673 observations. Statistics for Nairobi/Kenya are taken from Haushofer et al. (2014). ∗Data used for
Nairobi.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Contracts in the Risk Only Game
Payment Scheme 1 Payment Scheme 2 Overall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Mean Min Max + Mean Min Max + Rescaled
Risk Only Game
Transfer Promised HH 6.614 0 100 0.138 0.000 0 0 0.000 4.970
[19.969] [0.000] [17.541]
Transfer Promised HL 21.614 -100 150 0.553 60.774 0 250 0.655 23.794
[36.038] [67.407] [35.650]
Transfer Promised LL 3.819 0 100 0.087 0.000 0 0 0.000 2.870
[15.333] [0.000] [13.391]
Notes: Transfer is the transfer promised from a participant to her partner for each set of incomes. For incomes HH and
LL, I list the absolute values of the transfer promised. In payment scheme (1), H = 100 KSH, L= -100 KSH with 508
observations. In payment scheme (2), H= 400 KSH, L = 0 KSH with 168 individuals. + refers to the proportion of
observations in which positive transfers are made. Rescaled refers to average net transfers when transfers rescaled and
pooled. Standard deviations are in brackets.
Figure 2.1: Histogram of HL Transfers Promised
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Figure 2.2: Histogram of HH and LL Transfers Promised
Figure 2.3: Amount (of 100 KSH) Shared in the Anonymous Dictator Game
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Table 2.3: The Effects of Altruism on Sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Any HH or LL Any HL6=LH Transfers
Transfers Transfers Transfers HL
Participant Giver (α1) 0.271∗∗∗ 0.062 0.040 1.721
[0.079] [0.050] [0.052] [5.165]
Partner Giver (α2) 0.170∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ −0.001 2.501
[0.068] [0.040] [0.043] [4.724]
Both Giver (α3) −0.042 −0.120∗∗ 0.017 11.050
[0.093] [0.057] [0.063] [7.702]
Coefficient: α1 + α2 + α3 0.399∗∗∗ 0.072 0.055 15.271∗∗
P-Value: α1 + α2 + α3 0.000 0.135 0.219 0.012
Mean Neither Giver 0.451 0.084 0.099 16.127
[0.499] [0.280] [0.300] [37.100]
Observations 338 338 338 676
R-squared 0.195 0.178 0.041 0.095
Note: The omitted group includes partnerships in which both participants give 0 KSH in an anony-
mous dictator game, face payment scheme 1, threshold of 20, and game order 1. Standard errors
are clustered at the session level and are in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 2.4: The Effects of Social Proximity on Sharing
Panel A: Any Transfers
(1) (2) (3)
Same VE Group Partner Rel Partner Rel 2 Way
Relationship 0.025 0.026 −0.087
[0.081] [0.055] [0.084]
Mean No Relationship 0.676 0.672 0.687
[0.469] [0.471] [0.460]
Observations 338 328 328
R-squared 0.094 0.096 0.100
Panel B: Any HH or LL Transfers
Relationship −0.010 0.051 −0.008
[0.054] [0.037] [0.046]
Mean No Relationship 0.153 0.108 0.127
[0.361] [0.311] [0.333]
Observations 338 328 328
R-squared 0.161 0.177 0.172
Panel C: Any HL6=LH Transfers
Relationship 0.054 0.041 0.022
[0.061] [0.035] [0.034]
Mean No Relationship 0.125 0.113 0.119
[0.331] [0.317] [0.325]
Observations 338 328 328
R-squared 0.038 0.040 0.037
Panel D: Transfers HL
Relationship 2.179 −3.844 −3.500
[4.518] [3.190] [5.124]
Mean No Relationship 20.966 24.526 23.535
[35.587] [34.428] [35.667]
Observations 676 656 656
R-squared 0.061 0.073 0.071
Note: These regressions include game order, payment scheme, and threshold controls. Standard
errors are clustered at the session level and are in brackets.∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Same VE Group indicates whether a participant speaks the same language and lives in the same
village within Kibera as their partner (mean 0.357). Partner Rel indicates whether a participant
claims to know their partner outside the experiment (mean of 0.405). Partner Rel 2 Way indicates
whether a participant claims to know their partner outside the experiment and their partner claims
to know them outside the experiment (mean of 0.183).
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Table 2.5: The Effects of Pareto Weights on Sharing
Panel A: Any Transfers
(1) (2) (3)
Social Standing Assets Education
Participant (α1) 0.140∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.019
[0.062] [0.098] [0.049]
Partner (α2) 0.100 −0.268∗∗ −0.035
[0.081] [0.130] [0.053]
Partners Different (α3) 0.178∗ −0.013 −0.036
[0.088] [0.055] [0.043]
Mean Neither Above 0.769 0.769 0.687
[0.439] [0.439] [0.465]
R-squared 0.266 0.117 0.097
Panel B: Any HH or LL Transfers
Participant (α1) 0.045 0.030 0.032
[0.058] [0.059] [0.035]
Partner (α2) −0.031 −0.056 −0.049∗
[0.056] [0.054] [0.029]
Partners Different (α3) 0.134∗∗ −0.039 0.009
[0.062] [0.028] [0.039]
Mean Neither Above 0.200 0.154 0.129
[0.447] [0.376] [0.337]
R-squared 0.327 0.177 0.168
Panel C: Any HL6=LH Transfers
Participant (α1) 0.122∗ −0.014 0.096∗∗
[0.060] [0.114] [0.041]
Partner (α2) −0.024 −0.053 0.088∗∗
[0.072] [0.090] [0.041]
Partners Different (α3) 0.188∗ 0.008 −0.051
[0.094] [0.037] [0.035]
Mean Neither Above 0.000 0.154 0.074
[0.000] [0.376] [0.264]
Observations 109 328 338
R-squared 0.158 0.038 0.070
Continues Onto the Next Page...
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Panel D: Transfers HL
(1) (2) (3)
Social Standing Assets Education
Participant (α1) −0.888 −5.463 −2.640
[4.946] [5.933] [1.833]
Partner (α2) 0.873 4.633 −4.606∗∗
[3.149] [5.973] [1.815]
Partners Different (α3) 10.720∗ −2.411 −2.880
[5.463] [3.568] [3.052]
Mean Neither Above 19.500 22.115 26.922
[38.317] [30.337] [35.410]
Observations 217 656 676
R-squared 0.149 0.073 0.070
Note: These regressions include game order, payment scheme, and thresh-
old controls. Standard errors are clustered at the session level and are in
brackets.∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Social standing indicates
whether a participant reports that their partner has higher, the same, or lower
social standing than themselves. Assets is an index of whether their house-
hold has a TV, refrigerator, bike, vehicle, or electricity. Education indicates
whether a participant has at most some primary education. Partners different
indicates whether a participant and their partner have different (perceived
relative) social standing, assets, or education.
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Table 2.6: The Effects of Preference for Inequality on Sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Any HH or LL Any HL6=LH Transfers
Transfers Transfers Transfers HL
Participant Tolerates Inequality (α1) 0.021 −0.003 0.109∗ −0.244
[0.072] [0.053] [0.062] [3.917]
Partner Tolerates Inequality (α2) −0.079 −0.013 0.039 0.920
[0.091] [0.040] [0.052] [4.152]
Both Tolerate Inequality (α3) 0.121 0.012 −0.118 7.713
[0.123] [0.093] [0.081] [7.052]
Coefficient: α1 + α2 + α3 0.065 −0.004 0.030 8.389∗
P-Value: α1 + α2 + α3 0.371 0.938 0.414 0.097
Mean Neither Tolerate Inequality 0.688 0.128 0.082 21.193
[0.465] [0.336] [0.277] [38.259]
Observations 318 318 318 636
R-squared 0.121 0.17 0.052 0.096
Note: The omitted group includes partnerships in which neither participants agree with the statement that
“it is acceptable for two primary school teachers to earn different salaries if one was a more reliable worker
whose students performed better on standardized tests,” face payment scheme 1, threshold of 20, and game
order 1. Standard errors are clustered at the session level and are in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗p < 0.1.
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Table 2.7: The Effects of Risk Preferences on Sharing
Panel A: Any Transfers
(1) (2) (3)
Envelopes Choice Lotteries Not Gambler
Participant Risk Averse (α1) 0.024 0.107 0.228
[0.143] [0.080] [0.226]
Partner Risk Averse (α2) −0.040 0.037 −0.016
[0.155] [0.066] [0.210]
Partners Both Risk Averse (α3) 0.083 −0.108 −0.135
[0.180] [0.082] [0.258]
Coefficient: α1 + α2 + α3 0.067 0.035 0.076
P-Value: α1 + α2 + α3 [0.601] 0.583 0.679
Mean Neither Above 0.529 0.651 0.500
[0.515] [0.481] [0.522]
R-squared 0.137 0.101 0.203
Panel B: Any HH or LL Transfers
Participant Risk Averse (α1) 0.020 −0.014 0.048
[0.026] [0.068] [0.045]
Partner Risk Averse (α2) 0.084 −0.060 0.054
[0.065] [0.039] [0.048]
Partners Both Risk Averse (α3) −0.104 −0.001 −0.067
[0.076] [0.045] [0.067]
Coefficient: α1 + α2 + α3 0.000 −0.176 0.035
P-Value: α1 + α2 + α3 0.990 0.171 0.115
Mean Neither Above 0.000 0.159 0.000
[0.000] [0.368] [0.000]
R-squared 0.091 0.181 0.803
Panel C: Any HL6=LH Transfers
Participant Risk Averse (α1) 0.009 0.012 0.007
[0.079] [0.063] [0.079]
Partner Risk Averse (α2) 0.115 −0.033 0.055
[0.111] [0.042] [0.087]
Partners Both Risk Averse (α3) −0.107 0.036 −0.065
[0.133] [0.071] [0.101]
Coefficient: α1 + α2 + α3 0.017 0.015 −0.003
0.819 0.774 0.965
Mean Neither Above 0.059 0.111 0.033
P-Value: α1 + α2 + α3 [0.242] [0.317] [0.289]
Observations 137 328 115
R-squared 0.032 0.040 0.031
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Panel D: Transfers HL
(1) (2) (3)
Envelopes Choice Lotteries Not Gambler
Participant Risk Averse (α1) 5.369 7.949 1.435
[6.878] [4.974] [4.214]
Partner Risk Averse (α2) 4.641 9.300∗ 2.377
[7.002] [4.702] [11.784]
Partners Both Risk Averse (α3) −3.788 −6.308 −5.884
[10.062] [7.905] [14.591]
Coefficient: α1 + α2 + α3 6.223 10.941∗∗ −2.072
P-Value: α1 + α2 + α3 [0.332] 0.023 0.4533
Mean Neither Above 17.600 16.984 25.463
[21.022] [34.456] [38.770]
Observations 268 656 314
R-squared 0.098 0.083 0.125
Note: These regressions include game order, payment scheme, and threshold controls. Standard
errors are clustered at the session level and are in brackets.∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Envelopes indicates whether participants choose to divide 450 or 650 KSH almost equally between
two envelopes, where one will be randomly chosen for payment. Risk averse indicates whether the
participant chooses a 50-50% lottery of 1000-800 to a 50-50% lottery of 2000-100. Not gambler
indicates whether participants have not gambled, entered a charity sweepstakes, or bought into a
lottery such as dunga milli or zindua chapaa in the past 3 months.
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Table 2.8: The Effects of Gender on Sharing
(1) (2)
Any Transfers Transfers HL
Participant Male (α1) 0.042 6.212∗
[0.055] [3.676]
Partner Male (α2) 0.038 6.004
[0.055] [3.977]
Both Male (α3) −0.009 −0.827
[0.094] [7.319]
Coefficient: α1 + α2 + α3 0.072 11.389∗
P-Value: α1 + α2 + α3 0.335 0.057




Note: The omitted group includes all-female partnerships who face payment
scheme 1, threshold of 20, and game order 1. Standard errors are clustered
at the session level and are in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 2.9: The Effects of Experience with Sharing Outside the Experiment on Sharing in
the Experiment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Any HH or LL Any HL6=LH Transfers
Transfers Transfers Transfers HL
Participant Transfers Outside (α1) 0.048 −0.056 −0.048 −3.772
[0.086] [0.048] [0.057] [4.905]
Partner Transfers Outside (α2) −0.088 −0.004 −0.079 −2.522
[0.081] [0.046] [0.066] [4.679]
Both Transfers Outside (α3) 0.096 0.113 0.056 5.287
[0.107] [0.070] [0.074] [7.516]
Coefficient: α1 + α2 + α3 0.057 0.053 −0.070 −1.007
P-Value: α1 + α2 + α3 0.490 0.310 0.250 0.852
Mean Neither Transfers Outside 0.671 0.078 0.156 26.055
[0.473] [0.271] [0.366] [34.268]
Observations 338 338 338 676
R-squared 0.110 0.176 0.043 0.062
Note: The omitted group includes partnerships in which neither participant indicates that they rarely or not
often lend money or personal possessions to others, face payment scheme 1, threshold of 20, and game order
1. Standard errors are clustered at the session level and are in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
77
CHAPTER 3
Is All Income Considered Equal? Comparing the
Effects of Different Types of Income Shocks on
Household Consumption in Rural Mexico
In poor rural communities, households are limited in the resources they can use to cope with risk. In
this paper, I examine the extent to which households in rural Mexico smooth consumption against
a variety of idiosyncratic income shocks, including illness, natural disasters, and cash transfers
from a government program. I find that minor illness and natural disasters do not affect the growth
rate of household consumption, providing evidence that there is full consumption insurance within
the village network. In contrast, I find that cash transfers are not fully insured. A number of
explanations for why these income shocks are insured to varying extents include: observability,
how expected they are, the recipient of the household affected, whether they are positive or negative
income shocks, or whether they affect unearned or earned income. I find weak evidence that the
difference is due to social norms governing the sharing of unearned income, cash transfers, and
earned income, health and weather shocks. The results imply that the efficiency of social insurance
and poverty alleviation programs could be improved if policymakers take into account the different
levels of spillovers due to sharing within the village network.
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3.1 Introduction
Households in developing countries are vulnerable to income shocks such as weather, illness, and
unexpected expenses. Given that access to formal credit and insurance is often limited, households
use transfers and non-monetary aid from family and friends to smooth consumption. In addition,
households can cope with income shocks themselves, for example by taking children out of school
to work or by depleting savings. There is evidence that these methods allow households to cope with
risk, as households partially smooth consumption against idiosyncratic income shocks (Townsend,
1995; Townsend, 1994). However, less is known about whether all income shocks are insured to the
same extent. In this paper, I examine the extent to which a number of shocks to household income
are insured within the village network. I am primarily interested in understanding whether shocks
are insured against to differing extents.
The previous literature (e.g. Townsend 1994, Gertler and Gruber 2002) tests whether house-
holds are fully insured, but either does not distinguish between the sources of income change or
only evaluates the effects of a single type of shock. However, there is evidence that all income
is not spent similarly and that the source or recipient of income affects how it is spent (Banerjee
and Duflo, 2011; Bobonis, 2006; Duflo and Udry, 2004). In addition, experiments in developing
countries suggest that there are social norms governing sharing (Jakiela 2009, Mueller 2012). Thus,
there is reason to believe that all income shocks are not insured to the same extent. Examining
whether various types of shocks to income are insured to different extents can provide insight into
the functioning of informal risk sharing networks.
First, in Section 1, I examine whether different types of shocks to income are insured to different
extents in the context of rural Mexico. In Section 2, I describe the data, which was collected for
the evaluation of a government conditional cash transfer program, Progresa. These are villages for
which informal risk-sharing between households is especially prevalent since there is little formal
credit and insurance and there are extensive within-village familial connections (Angelucci and de
Giorgi, 2009).
Specifically, I examine whether natural disasters, both severe and minor illnesses, and the con-
ditional cash transfers are insured within the village. In Section 3, I estimate whether households in-
sure consumption against these shocks using a test of full insurance developed by Townsend (1994),
Mace (1991), and Cochrane (1991). If there is full consumption insurance within the village, the
growth rate of each household’s consumption should not depend on changes in the household’s
income once changes in aggregate resources are controlled for. I cannot reject that there is full
insurance for health and weather shocks. I can reject that there is full insurance for the Progresa
transfers, thus implying that the cash transfers are not fully shared within the village network.
In Section 4, I provide a number of robustness tests. I find some evidence that severe health
shocks are not fully insured (consistent with Gertler and Gruber, 2002). I conclude from the main
specification and robustness tests that minor health shocks and natural disasters are well insured,
whereas Progresa cash transfers are not fully shared within the village network.
In Section 5, I explore why these different income shocks are insured to varying extents. In
this particular context, potential explanations include: observability, how expected they are, the
79
recipient of the household affected, whether they are positive or negative income shocks, or whether
they affect unearned or earned income. I explore whether the results from previous literature on the
observability, expectations, or recipient of the shock can explain my results and I find no support
for the pattern found. I consider whether there are different norms governing the sharing of positive
and negative income shocks and I find little support for this explanation. Finally, I examine whether
there may be different rules governing the sharing of earned and unearned income. The Progresa
transfers are an unearned (or windfall) income shock, whereas health shocks and natural disasters
are shocks to earned income. I find some support for this explanation.
If income shocks are insured differently depending on the source of the income, then this should
inform the design of poverty alleviation programs. If policymakers are concerned with the social
spending multiplier, the amount of each dollar from a social program transfer that is shared, then
a program that targets labor force participation or wages may have very different impacts than
programs affecting unearned income, such as cash transfer programs. Further research is necessary
to establish whether there are social norms that govern how income is shared.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Data Source and Context
I use household panel data collected for the evaluation of Progresa (currently expanded and named
Oportunidades), a poverty alleviation program that targets poor households in rural Mexico. The
dataset contains information for all households in each of 506 rural villages in seven states in Mex-
ico.
The villages are rural and primarily agricultural. Villages are small, with 51 households on
average, and low mobility. Agriculture is the main activity for 97% of villagers and the only activity
for 56% of the villagers. Other activities include cattle farming and trade. In Table 3.1, I show
baseline characteristics of villages and households as well as households’ food consumption from
follow-up surveys. Food consumption per adult equivalent is monthly consumption in pesos and is
taken from Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009). Food consumption is based on each household’s report
of the quantity of food consumed, quantity of food purchased, and the cost of food purchased in the
past week. The conversion into adult equivalents is taken from Di Maro (2004), which finds that
children consume on average approximately 73% of the food intake of adults using the data on food
consumption from Progresa.
These communities are vulnerable to weather and health shocks. 6.79% of household heads
report that they could not work at least one day in the past month due to health reasons. 45.29%
of households report that they experienced some type of weather shock (including droughts, floods,
frosts, fires, plagues, earthquakes, and hurricanes) in the last 6 months. Droughts, frosts and floods
are the most frequent weather shocks, occurring for 30.18%, 9.98%, and 4.92% of households
respectively.
Despite this substantial risk, households face relatively little access to formal credit and insur-
ance. Less than 1% of villages have access to credit or consumption cooperatives and less than
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3% have access to other forms of associations (Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009). Informal institu-
tions, such as engagement in communal activities, parent associations, and community assemblies
are common (Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009). In addition, 80% of households have at least one
extended family member in the village and kinship networks are important (Angelucci et al., 2009).
Thus, risk-sharing between households is the primary channel through which households smooth
consumption.
3.2.2 Data and Measurement
In this section I will discuss the income shocks examined. The summary statistics for each income
shock are in Table 3.2.
I begin by discussing the cash transfers. Progresa provides conditional cash transfers to poor
households to improve education and health outcomes. There is a pre-program baseline survey in
March of 1997. Transfers begin in early 1998 and continue through the follow-up surveys in Oc-
tober 1998, March 1999, and November 1999. 320 villages are randomly assigned to receive the
Progresa transfers between May 1998 and November 1999. Eligibility status is determined for all
households in all villages and is not adjusted until November 1999; this limits strategic incentives
that households might have to maintain eligibility for the program. Households are grouped ac-
cording to whether they live in a village receiving transfers (treatment or control) and whether they
qualify for transfers (eligible or ineligible). The transfers are substantial, corresponding to 22% of
eligible households’ monthly income (Angelucci et al., 2015).
Next, I describe the weather shocks examined. The any natural disasters variable indicates
whether the household reported experiencing any natural disaster in the last 6 months, including:
droughts, floods, frosts, fires, plagues, earthquakes, and hurricanes. Although weather shocks are
likely aggregate shocks, occurring at the village or larger geographic region, this variable also cap-
tures idiosyncratic (within village) variation. In Figure 3.1, I show the distribution of proportion of
each village reporting any natural disaster in the past 6 months. For example, a village with a value
of 0.2 implies that 20% of the households in the village report a natural disaster in the past 6 months
of a particular survey wave. If natural disasters occur at the village level, then the distribution
presented in Figure 3.1 should be bimodal with mass points at 0 and 1. Instead, I find substantial
variation between 0 and 1, with 81% of villages with variation in reports of any natural disasters. Al-
though this could be measurement error, I assume the variable also captures idiosyncratic variation
in weather shocks.1
Finally, I discuss the health shocks examined. Couldn’t Do indicates whether the head of the
household reports any days in the past four weeks that he was unable to do daily activities (such as
going to work, doing household chores, going to school, and taking care of the children) for health
reasons. Although the household head reports the number of days he was sick, I use an indicator to
maximize power. The distribution of days reported sick (omitting observations with zero days sick
for exposition) is provided in Figure E.1. This measure captures minor illness, a negative health
1If households which cannot smooth consumption are more likely to report a weather shock, then this
undermines the identification strategy I use.
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shock.
To account for severe health shocks, I create an index of individuals’ physical ability to perform
activities of daily living (ADL). As Gertler and Gruber (2002) find, severe illness may not be fully
insured while minor illness is. Additionally, the ADL index is less susceptible to biases associated
with self-reported health status. I provide the distribution of the ADL Index in Figure E.2. In the
second panel of Table 3.2, I summarize each component of the ADL index. Each variable takes
value (1) if the respondent can perform the task easily, (2) if the respondent can do it with difficulty
and (3) if the respondent is unable to do it. The ADL index takes the value 1 if the head of household
can perform all activities without difficulty and 0 if he cannot perform any of the activities. Thus, a
one unit change in the ADL index should be interpreted as a movement from debilitating illness to
prime health, a positive health shock.
3.2.3 Relevance of Proposed Shocks to Income
In this section I establish that each shock examined corresponds to an income shock. The analysis
should be interpreted with caution because I may find that there is no effect of each shock on income
if households adjust income, for example by changing labor supply or selling items, to cope with
the shock. This analysis is also limited by the fact that the survey questions on income vary from
wave to wave and range in the recall period referenced.
In Table 3.3, I show the summary statistics for income variables that are comparable across
all three waves. Head HH Income refers to the income that the head of household reports. Income
refers to monthly income in pesos from: (1) salary from the primary job for the recall period that the
respondent chooses, (2) income from services such as sale of home cooked food, sale of clothing,
and transportation of people or goods in the past month, (3) income from pension for old age,
disability, or widowhood for the recall period the respondent chooses and (4) aid from government
programs. I also include comprehensive income variables for each survey wave (Income 1998n,
Income 1999m and Income 1999n), which contain all components of income available from the
survey except those relating to monetary aid from others, government transfers, and credit/loans.
I exclude these variables because they are sources that households could use to cope with income
shocks and smooth consumption.
The 1998 November monthly income variable is the most comprehensive.2 In Table 3.4 Panel
A, I show the summary statistics for different income variables for November 1998 (measured at
the household level). In Panel B, I show the summary statistics for all components of the income
measure. The largest components of income are from government aid, specifically from the PRO-
CAMPO program (not shown in table), and salary.
In Table 3.5, I regress income (per adult equivalent) on all shocks to establish that the shocks
have an affect on income. Since income includes adjustments in response to the shock and mea-
2In addition it includes (1) the other monetary benefits the respondent receives from his or her primary job
for the recall period that the respondent specifies, (2) the other work for a salary or wage that the respondent
receives for the recall period specified, (3) other sources of income including interest from banks, rent of
animals/land/products and community earnings, (4) the sale of crops in the past 6 months, (5) the sale of
animals in the past 6 months, and (6) the sale of animal products, such as milk or cheese, in the past month.
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surement error, this serves as lower bound of the effect of the shocks on household income. The
regression takes the form:
Incomeijt = α+ βShockijt + ijt
where i = household, j = village, t = period, β refers to a vector of coefficients for the vector
of shocks, Shockijt. I run this regression for all income measures.
For Income, ∆ Income, and Income 1998N, I find that incidence of any natural disasters, good
health as measured by the ADL Index, and incidence of poor health as measured by Couldn’t Do
correspond to statistically significant changes in income with the expected signs. Although I do
not find statistically significant effects of receiving Progresa on income, I know the transfers were
administered with certainty; receipt of the Progresa transfers is not reported in the household survey.
Thus, I conclude that the shocks I examine do correspond to changes in household income.
In comparing the effects of the shocks on the Income 1998 November to the Income 1998
November All variables provides insight into the channels through which households cope with
shocks. In examining the effects of shocks on Income 1998 November All, I find that minor health
shocks (Couldn’t Do) correspond to a statistically insignificant change in income, and that both
natural disasters and severe health shocks correspond to marginally significant increases in income.
This suggests that households are able to smooth income with use of government aid, monetary aid
from their network, credit, and loans.
3.2.4 Exogeneity of Shocks
In Table 3.6, I examine whether household characteristics, including an index capturing village
poverty, the number of households in the village, household wealth, head of household age, and
household land size, predict incidence of each shock. I find that household characteristics, such
as head of household age and household land size, reliably predict reporting shocks. However, the
economic magnitudes of the effects are small, corresponding to 1% -5.3% change in reporting a
shock. Although I cannot prove that incidence of the shocks examined is exogenous, I can provide
evidence that household characteristics are economically insignificantly correlated with reports of
the shocks.
3.3 Empirical Specification and Analysis
I use an empirical specification based on the theory of full insurance (Mace 1991; Cochrane, 1991;
Townsend 1994). If households share risk within their community, growth in each household’s con-
sumption will not depend on idiosyncratic shocks to the household’s income once the growth in
community resources, typically measured using village average log consumption or village-period
dummies, is accounted for. This test assumes that the shocks are uncorrelated with shifts in prefer-
ences and that income pooling occurs at the village level. Note that this test of full insurance cannot
directly speak to the methods through which households smooth consumption.
To avoid omitted variable bias concerns, I use a first-difference specification since it removes
time invariant effects and requires weaker assumptions than household fixed effects. I use logarithm
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of household consumption, which removes 105 households (of 32,451) who report zero consump-
tion. I assume that the village is the relevant network for risk sharing. However, I cannot use first
differences for the Progresa transfers, since programs transfers are given to eligible households in
treated villages for all survey waves. Instead, I compare the growth rate of household consumption
of eligible households in treated villages to that of eligible households in untreated villages (the
omitted group).
I implement the test of full insurance in the following regression for the natural disaster, health
shocks, and Progresa transfers:
∆ lnCijt = β0shockijt + β00TEijt + β01TIijt + β11CIijt + β1∆lnCjt + ijt
where i = household, j = village, t = period, T = treatment village, C = control village,
E = eligible household and I =ineligible household. logCijt refers to log household monthly food
consumption per adult equivalent, lnCjt is average village log consumption, and shockijt is a vector
of shocks (Any Disaster, ADL Index, Couldn’t Do) to household income. The average village log
consumption variable includes all households with non-missing observations for log consumption
and does not include the household i itself. I also run the regression for each shock separately.
With full insurance, income shocks should have no effect on household consumption other
than through their effect on aggregate village consumption. That is, with full insurance, we expect
β0 = 0. If the village is the appropriate network of risk sharing and consumption is perfectly
measured, then β1 = 1. As is typical in the literature, I will focus the coefficient, β0.3
If there is partial insurance, I expect that minor health shocks and natural disasters, which have
a negative impact on income, would have a negative impact on growth rate of consumption, i.e.
β0 < 0. Since ADL Index corresponds to a large improvement in health and Progresa corresponds
to a positive income shock, I expect that β0 > 0 for these shocks.
In Table 3.7, I test whether the coefficient on shockijt, β0 is statistically significant from 0.4
I find weather shocks and both types of health shocks do not significantly influence household
consumption, controlling for village level resources. I find that recipient of Progresa transfers
does correspond to an increase in the growth rate of household consumption, i.e. the coefficient is
statistically significant from zero at the 5% level when I include all shocks (Col 1).
3For Progresa recipients, β00 may be 0 for reasons unrelated to full insurance since the analysis compares
the growth rates of consumptions for eligible households in treatment to that of eligible households in control
villages. For example, since program transfers stay relatively constant across the survey period, it is possible
that Progresa increased consumption initially, but the growth rate of consumption across the periods in which
transfers are made is constant.
4The coefficient β1 is statistically different from 1 for all shocks. This may be due to the fact that the
village is not the appropriate level of income pooling, and that instead it may occur at a sub-village level (the
implications of which are discussed in De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006), such as the extended family network
(Angelucci et al., 2010).
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3.4 Robustness
I provide a number of checks to examine whether the results are robust to alternative specifica-
tions. In practice, there are a diverse number of specifications used to test full insurance. Typically,
researchers use village time dummies (Gertler and Gruber, 2002; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2005)
instead of using village average income or consumption to capture village level shocks (due to data
availability).
In Table 3.8, I use village period dummies instead of village average log consumption to capture
aggregate shocks. With the inclusion of village period dummies, I drop one of the category dummies
in the Progresa regressions since household eligibility for Progresa is constant throughout the sur-
vey period. I then test whether the coefficient on treated eligible is different from the control eligible
households. In contrast to the previous results, I find that severe improvement in health corresponds
to a positive change in the growth rate of household consumption and that eligible households in
both control and treated villages experience growth in consumption that is not statistically different
(with a p-value of 0.882).
Alternatively, I could examine whether changes in shock status rather than incidence of the
shock has an effect on household consumption. When I include all shocks, I use data from two
survey waves and thus the results are equivalent to using household fixed effects.5 Note that the
Progresa regression cannot be run for this empirical specification since Progresa transfers are time
invariant at the household level for the periods surveyed.
∆ lnCijt = α+ β0∆shockijt + β1∆lnCjt + +ijt
The results are presented in Table 3.9 Column (1). I find that the coefficient on ADL Index is
statistically significant. Note that it is difficult to interpret the coefficients on Any Disaster and
Couldn’t Do since the variables take a value of -1 when the household recovers from a previous
negative shock, +1 when the household has experienced a negative shock, and 0 if the household
experiences no change in shock from the previous period.
Thus far, the empirical specification implicitly assumes no time varying preference shifts. How-
ever, as the household ages or household composition changes there may be preference shocks. In
Table 3.9 Column (2) I control for head of household age and age squared and in Column (3) I
control for changes in household size (in terms of adult equivalents) as in Townsend (1994). In Col-
umn (2) I again find that the coefficient on ADL Index is positive and statistically significant. The
statistical significance of the coefficients for the other shocks align with those found in the main
results.
Overall, the robustness checks confirm the finding that Progresa transfers are not fully insured,
5I had the choice between using household fixed estimator and the first differences estimator. The fixed
effects model requires the assumption of strict exogeneity. The first differences model differences out tempo-
rally adjacent observations for the same household. In doing so, the first differences model also cancels out
time invariant unobserved components. The first differences model requires weaker assumptions than those
needed for the fixed effects model. It assumes that the transitory component of the error term is uncorrelated
with the conditioning variables in the current period, the period before, and the period after. The drawback is
that this estimator is less efficient than the fixed effects model.
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while weather shocks and minor health shocks are fullly insured in the village. In contrast to the
main findings, I find some evidence that severe health shocks are not fully insured. This is consistent
with Gertler and Gruber (2002) who find that severe illnesses (also using an ADL index) are not fully
insured whereas minor health shocks are.
3.5 Interpretation
In this section, I consider a number of explanations that might explain why health, weather, and
cash shocks are insured to differing extents, including: (1) the observability of income shocks,
(2) the recipient of the income shock within the household, (3) whether the shock is expected,
(4) differences in the sharing of positive and negative income shocks, and (5) the social norms
governing the sharing of income derived from effort and windfall income. I cannot consider whether
the framing of the Progresa program, preventability of the shocks, or magnitudes of the shocks have
an effect on how the shocks are insured.6
3.5.1 Observability of Income Shocks
Progresa transfers are more observable than incidence of health and weather shocks. Progresa
is implemented at the village level and the criteria for eligibility was public information; thus, it
is observable which individuals within the village are eligible for program transfers. In contrast,
I examine within-village idiosyncratic variation in natural disasters and health shocks, which are
presumably less observable to others in the village.
Theoretically, hidden income, or unobservable idiosyncratic income shocks, should limit inter-
household insurance (Townsend, 1995; Kinnan, 2012; Chandrasekhar et al., 2011). Goldberg (2011)
and Jakiela and Ozier (2016) find that publicly observed income is subject to more social pressure
to share than hidden income. In light of the previous literature, I would then expect that Progresa
transfers are relatively more insured than weather and health shocks. Since I find the opposite, I
conclude that the observability of the shocks cannot fully explain the pattern of results.
3.5.2 Recipient of the Income Shock
Alternatively, the shocks examined affect different members within each household. There is a
substantial literature showing that the recipient of income affects how the transfer is spent (Duflo,
2000; Bobonis, 2009). Rainfall affects the general household income in rural Mexico (Bobonis,
2009), and so it is reasonable to expect that natural disasters primarily affect general household
income. In contrast, Progresa transfers are given to women. The health shocks are defined as
occuring to the head of household, who is typically male.
6Progresa is framed as a program for poor households to invest in the health and education of their
children. The framing of the program possibly made it easier for households to resist pressure to share their
income. However, Angelucci et al. (2009, 2015) find that eligible households who receive transfers share
with ineligible family in their villages.
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There is considerable evidence that women are subject to more social pressure to share than
men (Jakiela and Ozier, 2016; Robinson, 2012; Anderson and Baland, 2002). Given this literature, I
would expect that Progresa transfers are relatively more insured than the weather and health shocks.
I find the opposite and thus conclude that although the recipient of the transfer may matter, it is
unlikely to explain the pattern of results I find.
3.5.3 Whether the Shock is Expected
Additionally, the shocks vary in how expected or unexpected they are. Progresa transfers are ex-
pected, since the eligibility and frequency of transfers was announced when the program began. In
contrast, health and weather shocks are generally considered unexpected income shocks. Theoreti-
cally, predictable income changes should have no effect on the growth rate of consumption (Fried-
man, 1957). Thus, Progresa transfers should have a smaller effect on the growth rate of household
consumption than the health and weather shocks. Instead I find the opposite pattern empirically.
3.5.4 Difference in the Sharing of Positive and Negative Shocks
A fourth explanation is that positive and negative shocks are shared to different extents, either due to
loss aversion, social norms, or limited commitment in risk sharing. The simple neoclassical income
pooling model implies symmetry between positive and negative income shocks - if there is full
insurance, a household facing a positive income shock gives to a household experiencing a negative
income shock.
The Progresa transfer is a positive income shock and incidence of a weather shock or poor health
is a negative income shock. However, recovering from an adverse health or weather shock likely
corresponds to a positive income shock. In Table 3.10, I examine whether positive and negative
income shocks are insured to differing extents. Specifically I examine whether positive income
shocks are less insured than negative income shocks within the village network. I find little evidence
for this. Recovering from a severe health shock and receiving Progresa transfers are associated
with statistically significant increases in household consumption; however, recovering from a minor
health shock or weather shocks does not show the same pattern. In contrast, experiencing a negative
weather shock (relative to the previous period) is associated with statistically significant increase
in growth rate of household consumption (likely due to the PROCAMPO program in Mexico) and
minor health shocks are associated with a decrease in household consumption. Overall there is not
clear support for the hypothesis that positive income shocks are not fully insured, while negative
income shocks are.
3.5.5 Social Norms Governing Earned and Unearned Income
Finally, I consider whether different social norms governing the sharing of earned and unearned
income can explain the results. Although Progresa is a conditional cash transfer, it is effectively
an unconditional cash transfer for recipients with primary aged children (Skoufias, 2005). For
households with primary aged children, Progresa is a windfall transfer. In contrast, health shocks
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affect the household’s ability to earn income. Natural disasters affect the household’s agricultural
output that households exert effort for. In the context of dictator games, there is evidence that the
source of income affects how it is shared (Jakiela, 2015; Mueller 2012; Rey-Biel et al., 2015). The
evidence on how the source of income affects how it is shared, particularly when there is risk, is
mixed. In the context of risk-sharing games, I find (Jain, 2016) that individuals are more likely to
share when income is the result of both risk and effort than when income is solely the result of risk.
In Table 3.11, I explore whether households for whom Progresa is effectively an unconditional
cash transfer experience positive growth in consumption. In Column (1) I include dummies for
whether households have any children in the particular level of schooling for all treatment and eli-
gibility groups. In Column (2) I include the proportion of the total children in the household who
fall into each category of schooling for treatment-eligible groups. In Column (3) I instead include
number of children that fall into the particular category of schooling for each group. For Columns
(2) and (3), the p-value reports whether households in treatment villages with the same proportion
or number of children in primary school experience different growth rates of household consump-
tion in comparison to similar households in control villages. When I control for any children in
primary school (Column (1)) I find evidence that the households for whom Progresa is effectively
an unconditional cash transfer are likely to experience positive growth in household consumption. I
do not find that this is true when I control for the proportion or number of children. This is, at best,
suggestive evidence that this explanation might explain the main results.
3.6 Conclusion
I examine how well households can smooth consumption against a variety of idiosyncratic income
shocks. I find that health and weather shocks are relatively well insured whereas cash transfers are
less insured within the village community. I provide a number of robustness checks that suggest
that extreme illness may not be fully insured within village networks. Given the result that minor
health shocks and natural disasters are better insured than cash transfers, I consider a variety of
explanations for the difference. I find that the most plausible explanation is that there are different
social norms governing the sharing of earned and unearned income.
A limitation of this paper is that I examine how well households are insured only for food
consumption and not all expenditures. Despite the fact that households appear to be smoothing
their food consumption over health and weather shocks, this does not rule out large welfare gains
with the introduction of private (or social) insurance (Chetty and Looney, 2006). For example,
consider an economy where the private market insurance is limited and households are close to
subsistence levels of consumption. Households with high levels of risk aversion might be reluctant
to cut consumption further due to fears of starvation and cope by using other methods, such as
taking children out of school, to avoid a substantial consumption drop. Thus, despite the fact that I
find that households smooth food consumption relatively well for health and weather shocks, there
may be huge welfare gains with the introduction of formal insurance.
This paper should direct further research to identify whether there are social norms governing
the sharing of earned and unearned income, as well as positive and negative income shocks. A
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better understanding of informal insurance arrangements could inform the design of programs such
as Progresa, since policy makers could account for spillover effects of programs within the villages.
It can also provide insight into which specific risks are most debilitating for households who do not
have access to formal insurance and other market methods to smooth consumption.
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Figures and Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Survey N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Head of Household (HH) Male HH Baseline 17820 0.895 0 1
Head of HH Age HH Baseline 17820 47.006 15.945 15 99
Head of HH Literate HH Baseline 17820 0.684 0 1
Head of HH Speak Dialect HH Baseline 17820 0.353 0 1
Village Level Poverty Index Village Baseline 498 0.469 0.724 −1 3
# Households in the Village Village Baseline 499 51.671 34.139 2 289
Household Wealth Index HH Baseline 17771 732.981 138.222 180 1358
Land Size by HH HH Baseline 17820 2.516 6.599 0 158
Log Monthly Food Consumption HH x Period 32451 198.241 298.753 4 23342
Note: The sample includes households who report non-missing values for changes in log food consumption. Land size
is in hectares and monthly food consumption is reported in pesos per adult equivalent.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Variables of Interest
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Any Natural Disaster 32145 0.453 0.498 0 1
Progresa Recipient 32450 0.478 0.500 0 1
HH Head Any Days Couldn’t Do 31291 0.068 0.252 0 1
ADL Index 31199 0.896 0.222 0 1
Composition of ADL Index:
Vigorous Activities 31276 1.280 0.580 1 3
Moderate Activities 31270 1.257 0.555 1 3
Carry Heavy Loads for a Distance 31265 1.245 0.547 1 3
Lift Loads 31266 1.178 0.458 1 3
Can Walk 2 Kilometers 31256 1.228 0.530 1 3
Can Get Ready and Bathe Self 31230 1.061 0.278 1 3
Note: The sample includes households (HH) who report non-missing values for
changes in log food consumption.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of the Fraction of Village Reporting Any Natural Disaster
Table 3.3: Measurement of Income
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Head HH Income 59288 902.839 8043.041 0 1305523.0
Income per Adult Equivalent (AE) 59288 258.680 1478.186 0 134286.8
Income 1998n per AE 21119 234.835 1309.568 0 119914.0
Income 1998n All per AE 21119 319.527 1643.230 0 119914.0
Income 1999m per AE 18099 181.660 345.974 0.81630444.8
Income 1999m All per AE 18099 240.705 988.184 0.81655337.8
Income 1999n per AE 20070 316.410 1354.166 0 134286.8
Income 1999n All per AE 20070 274.445 1983.611 0 137237.3
Note: The sample includes all households who report non-missing values for log food consump-
tion. All income variables are defined per adult equivalent (AE) at the household level. The
definition for each of the income variables appears in the text.
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Table 3.4: The Components of 1998 November Income
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A
Head HH Income 931.618 6251.529 0 543515.0
Head HH Income 1998n 714.051 5072.958 0 543515.0
Head HH Income 1998n All 1133.023 6610.368 0 543515.0
Income 1298.944 8050.196 0 543515.0
Income 1998n 1132.089 7196.295 0 543515.0
Income 1998n All 1522.320 8326.164 0 543515.0
Panel B
Money Aid 21.097 183.278 0 6000.0
Government Aid 362.576 4082.299 0 182620.8
Borrowing 6.558 122.779 0 12000.0
Crop Sales 33.256 259.888 0 8166.7
Animal Sales 38.692 1700.292 0 133332.0
Product Sales 7.116 235.720 0 28812.0
Salary 925.180 6890.281 0 543515.0
Benefits 4.049 209.889 0 32610.9
Other Work 105.223 734.062 0 65243.5
Other Sources 16.708 788.969 0 121747.2
Note: The sample includes all households (21119 observations) who report non-missing
values for log food consumption.
Table 3.5: The Impact of Shocks on Income
Income ∆ Income Income 1998N Income 1998N
All
Any Disaster −40.640∗∗∗ −30.980∗∗∗ −17.010∗∗∗ 14.380∗
[4.313] [5.233] [4.804] [7.930]
ADL Index 29.940∗∗∗ 34.790∗∗∗
[8.012] [9.977]
Couldn’t Do −37.740∗∗∗ −25.660∗∗ −4.687 20.930∗
[6.836] [10.670] [6.005] [12.250]
Progresa Recipient −3.954 4.761 −3.955 −2.124
[7.347] [4.220] [7.909] [10.790]
Constant 190.500∗∗∗ 3.015 190.900∗∗∗ 220.400∗∗∗
[9.758] [10.040] [7.418] [9.341]
Observations 36297 30885 20129 20129
R-squared 0.024 0.004 0.032 0.017
Note: Income is per adult equivalent and has been winsorized at the 1% level. Co-
efficients for treated and control non-poor are omitted. Robust standard errors are in
brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 3.6: Likelihood of Reporting Each Type of Shock
Any ADL Couldn’t Progresa
Disaster Index Do Recipient
Village Poverty Index 0.024 0.008∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.074∗∗
[0.017] [0.003] [0.003] [0.035]
# HHs in the Village 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Household Wealth Index 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Head of Household Age 0.002∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Household Land Size 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
Constant 0.289∗∗∗ 1.235∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ 1.402∗∗∗
[0.043] [0.009] [0.011] [0.088]
Observations 32039 31097 31183 32345
R-squared 0.017 0.295 0.044 0.092
Note: The sample includes households (HH) who report non-missing values for
changes in log food consumption. Regressions include controls for head of house-
hold gender, whether the head of household is literate, and speaks a dialect. Ro-
bust standard errors are in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 3.7: Test of Full Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Household Log Consumption
Any Disaster 0.002 0.003
[0.006] [0.004]
ADL Index 0.004 −0.001
[0.005] [0.004]
Couldn’t Do −0.007 −0.009
[0.014] [0.014]
Progresa Recipient 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
[0.005] [0.003]
∆ Village Avg Log Consumption 0.702∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗
[0.017] [0.017] [0.024] [0.017] [0.017]
Observations 30885 31857 15061 30436 32450
R-squared 0.053 0.051 0.044 0.053 0.052
Note: Village Avg Log Consumption does not include the consumption of the household itself.
Progresa Recipient reports the coefficient for treated x eligible households and omits the coeffi-
cients for treated x ineligible and control x ineligible households. Robust standard errors are in
brackets and are clustered at the village level. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 3.8: Test of Full Insurance with Village Period Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Household Log Consumption
Any Disaster 0.014 0.012
[0.009] [0.009]
ADL Index 0.052∗∗∗ 0.001
[0.016] [0.024]
Couldn’t Do 0.013 −0.015
[0.017] [0.015]
Progresa Recipient x Poor 0.024∗∗ 0.022∗∗
[0.010] [0.009]
Control x Poor 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
[0.008] [0.007]
Observations 30885 31857 15061 30436 32450
R-squared 0.103 0.1 0.094 0.103 0.100
Village Time Dummies x x x x x
P-Value Test 0.882 0.967
Note: P-Value Test refers to a test of whether the coefficient on Progresa Recipient x Poor is
statistically different than Control x Poor. Robust standard errors are in brackets and are clustered
at the village level. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 3.9: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3)
Household Log Consumption
Any Disaster 0.005 0.006 −0.005
[0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
ADL Index 0.094∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.006
[0.022] [0.016] [0.005]
Couldn’t Do 0.033∗∗ 0.012 −0.004
[0.015] [0.015] [0.014]
Progresa Recipient 0.015∗∗∗ 0.009∗
[0.005] [0.005]
∆ Village Avg Log Consumption 0.667∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗
[0.025] [0.017] [0.017]
Observations 14765 30885 30885
R-squared 0.045 0.053 0.057
∆ Shock x
Controls for Age and Age Squared x
Control for Change in HH Size x
Note: Village Avg Log Consumption does not include the consumption of the
household itself. Progresa Recipient reports the coefficient for treated x eligible
households and omits the coefficients for treated x ineligible and control x ineli-
gible households. Robust standard errors are in brackets and are clustered at the
village level. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 3.10: Test of Full Insurance - Positive and Negative Income Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Household Log Consumption
Positive Income Shocks
Any Disaster −0.011 −0.011∗
[0.007] [0.006]
ADL Index 0.032∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
[0.011] [0.010]
Couldn’t Do −0.036 −0.028
[0.065] [0.064]
Progresa Recipient 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.00275]
Negative Income Shocks
Any Disaster 0.031∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
[0.009] [0.007]
ADL Index −0.003 −0.020∗
[0.005] [0.011]
Couldn’t Do −0.111∗ −0.109∗
[0.057] [0.058]
∆ Village Avg Log Consumption 0.703∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗
[0.017] [0.017] [0.024] [0.017] [0.017]
Observations 30885 31857 15061 30436 32450
R-squared 0.054 0.052 0.045 0.053 0.052
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets and clustered at the village level. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 3.11: Test of Full Insurance - By Children’s School Status
(1) (2) (3)
Dummies Proportion Number
Treated x Eligible x Primary School 0.025∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
[0.007] [0.011] [0.003]
Treated x Eligible x Secondary School −0.008 −0.001 −0.001
[0.008] [0.010] [0.004]
Treated x Ineligible x Primary School 0.015 0.023 0.005
[0.015] [0.024] [0.009]
Treated x Ineligible x Secondary School −0.018 −0.027∗ −0.008
[0.013] [0.015] [0.007]
Control x Eligible x Primary School 0.013 0.008∗∗
[0.015] [0.004]
Control x Eligible x Secondary School −0.004 −0.033∗∗ −0.008∗
[0.007] [0.016] [0.005]
Control x Ineligible x Primary School 0.002 −0.006 0.006
[0.018] [0.022] [0.010]
Control x Ineligible x Secondary School −0.029∗ −0.044∗∗ −0.021∗∗
[0.017] [0.017] [0.008]
∆ Village Avg Log Consumption 0.697∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗
[0.017] [0.019] [0.017]
Observations 32451 26725 32451
R-squared 0.052 0.057 0.052
P-Value for Test of Equality 0.401 0.812
Note: In Col (1) and (2) the coefficients for Other x group (eligible treated, eligible control) are not
shown, and the omitted category is control eligible households with primary school aged children.
In Col (2) and (3), the omitted category is those with no children. Robust standard errors are in




Note: The games were implemented with respondents by a trained staff at the Busara Center
for Behavioral Economics in a mix of English and Swahili. The scripts were written in English
with input from the laboratory assistants, then forward and back-translated into Swahili. The
scripts shown here are in English. Swahili translations are available on request. The version
provided is for payment scheme 1. Payment scheme 2 differs in the payment structure and
provides examples of contracts. Both scripts are available in the online appendix on my web-
site.
INTRODUCTION TO GAMES:
Welcome to our experiment! This study is for researchers from the University of Michigan who are
conducting research about financial decision-making. Today we will play a number of games. For
each game you will be making decisions that might determine how much money you will take home
today. In these games there are no right and wrong answers. In the games you will be playing with a
randomly assigned partner who you will be able to communicate with at certain stages of the game.
No one other than your partners will know your choices in the games. After all games have been
played, your choices from one of the games will be randomly chosen for payment. Please press the
Continue button now.
GENERAL GAMES INTRODUCTION:
Now we will explain the structure of the games you will play today. The games are designed to
mimic behavior you might have encountered in your daily life.
We start by giving 350 KSH to both you and your partner. In each game, you and your partner
may receive an income shock. Imagine that you are merchants selling your goods, such as food or
clothing, on the street. You may be lucky or unlucky, and your partner may be lucky or unlucky. If
you are lucky, you have a lot of customers and earn 100 KSH. If you are unlucky, you have no sales
and lose 100 KSH.
For both you and your partner, we will decide if you are unlucky or lucky randomly - as though we
are rolling a die to decide your income. Your luck is not related to your partner’s luck and so you
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both face the same likelihood of getting lucky or unlucky.
You will be able to use income in this game in ways that mimic real life behavior: you will decide
how much of the income you want to keep and how much you want to give, if anything, to your
partner. Before income is decided, you and your partner will come up with a contract that promises
how much you might give to or receive from your partner. The promise can depend on whether you
and your partner were unlucky or lucky. You and your partner must both agree to the contract for
transfers to occur. If you and your partner cannot agree, then no transfers will be made.
Then, income will be determined by chance. Your income at the of each game will be how much
money you keep in addition to the transfers you and your partner make to each other. You will find
out what income you receive after all games have been played.
Now we will describe the games. All games have the structure we just described. In one of the
games, your income will only depend on whether you were lucky or unlucky. In other games, you
will be able to choose whether you want to work on a task, which makes you more likely to be
lucky. In every game your partner will always be able to see the income you receive. Please press
the Continue button now.
LUCK ONLY GAME
Remember, you and your partner both received 350 KSH at the beginning of the session today. If
you are lucky you will receive 100 KSH and if you are unlucky you will lose 100 KSH. In this game
there is a 3 in 4 chance that you will be lucky and a 1 in 4 chance that you will be unlucky. In the
picture shown, it is as though you are reaching into the jar and picking up one of the balls without
looking. If you get the red ball you are unlucky and if you get the blue ball you are lucky. Please
press the Continue button when you are ready to proceed.
Before we draw a ball to determine your incomes, you and your partner will be able to com-
municate to come up with a contract that specifies the promises that you make to each other for all
possible scenarios.
• If both you and your partner are lucky.
• If you are lucky and your partner is unlucky.
• If you are unlucky and your partner is lucky.
• If both you and your partner are unlucky.
You can give as much or as little of your income as you would like - there are no right or wrong
choices. We will record the promise that you and your partner make to each other for each of the
four scenarios. You both must come to an agreement, otherwise no transfers will be made. Then,
each of you must enter exactly the same contract into the computer. You cannot both give and re-
ceive in the same promise. For example, if you say that you will receive 10 KSH, your partner must
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say that she will give 10 KSH. You will not be allowed to revise the promise after you find out how
much income you and your partner make.
Once promises are made, income will be determined by the computer. Depending on what income
you and your partner receive, transfers will be made based on the promises you and your partner had
chosen. Recall that if this game is chosen for payment, the money you will be paid is the income
after transfers are made. You will be able to see what income you and your partner received, and
will find out what amount of money you received in this game at the end of the session today.
Please press the Continue button when you are ready to proceed.
Please answer the following questions [answered through the touchscreen computer - if the
question is answered incorrectly, the research assistants will go around to individually explain and
participant will need to re-answer the question correctly]:
(If the first game:) Will you be able to see your partner’s income? [YES] Are you allowed to change
the transfer you promised once you see what your partner’s income is? [NO] Will you receive pay-
ment for your decision in this game for sure? [NO] Is it possible for you and your partner to write a
contract where you make no transfers to each other? [YES] Can you give or receive transfers from
your partner if you both cannot agree on a contract? [NO]
(If not the first game:) Will you be choosing whether to complete the counting task in this game?
([NO]
Let’s start playing the game! You will be playing the next game with the person sitting in seat
INSERT. Now is the time to discuss with your partner the transfers that you would want to give and
receive. In the next stages you will be asked to write down a contract where you tell us:
• The transfer seat you give or receive if seat number INSERT receives 100 KSH and seat
number INSERT receives 100 KSH.
• The transfer seat you give or receive if seat number INSERT receives 100 KSH and seat
number INSERT loses 100 KSH.
• The transfer seat you give or receive if seat number INSERT loses 100 KSH and seat number
INSERT receives 100 KSH.
• The transfer seat you give or receive if seat number INSERT loses 100 KSH and seat number
INSERT loses 100 KSH.
Remember you begin the game with 350 KSH. Therefore, if you receive 100 KSH, you can give
up to 450 KSH and if you lose 100 KSH, you can give up to 250 KSH. When you and your partner
are done with your discussion, please press the Continue button.
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[Worksheet 1 handed out Enumerators ensure that participants always write the participant in
the pair with the lower seat number first on their sheets.]
Did you and your partner agree on a contract? Remember, if you did not agree on a contract,
then no transfers will be made.
(If both participants agree:) Remember you begin the game with 350 KSH. If you are unlucky,
you would have 250 KSH and if you are lucky you would have 450 KSH. Choose how much you
are willing to give to or receive from your partner in each scenario:
• If seat INSERT is lucky and receives 100 KSH and seat INSERT is also lucky and receives
100 KSH:
• If seat INSERT is lucky and receives 100 KSH and seat INSERT is unlucky and loses 100
KSH:
• If seat INSERT is unlucky and loses 100 KSH and seat INSERT is lucky and receives 100
KSH:
• If seat INSERT is unlucky and loses 100 KSH and seat INSERT is also unlucky and loses
100 KSH:
[For each the participant enters - I (GIVE/RECEIVE) and (AMOUNT) KSH.]
(If the contracts entered are not the same:) Did you make a mistake in entering the transfers? We
will give you one more chance to correctly enter the amounts you are willing to give to or receive
from your partner.
EFFORT OBSERVABLE GAME
Remember, you and your partner both received 350 KSH at the beginning of the session today. In
this game income is determined both by luck and whether you work hard to complete a task, the
counting task. If you complete the counting task then you will be more likely to get lucky than if
you do not complete the task. Whether you complete the task and your income will be observed by
your partner and you will see whether your partner completes the task and what his/her income is.
Please press the Continue button now.
(If an effort game has not been played:) Now we are going to introduce the counting task to
you. The task consists of grids with 0s and 1s. Your job is to correctly count the number of zeros
for as many grids as possible. There is no penalty for incorrect answers. You will now be given two
minutes to try this task out. We want you to try your best, and so will pay you 2 KSH per correct
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answer. Please press the Continue button now to start.
For the game with your partner, the task will last 5 minutes. To complete the task, you need to
correctly count the 0s for at least 45 grids within the 5 minute time period. Remember that if you
complete the task, then you will face more favorable probabilities of good luck.
At any time in the 5 minutes, you can stop attempting the task and can instead relax and watch the
video we have provided by pressing the Video button. You can also switch from watching the video
back to the counting task by pressing the Attempt Task button. Please press the Continue button now.
If you complete the task then there will be a 3 in 4 chance that you will be lucky and a 1 in 4
chance that you will be unlucky. If you do not complete the task then you will face less favorable
probabilities that you are lucky. If you choose not to complete the task then instead there will be a
1 in 4 chance that you will be lucky and a 3 in 4 chance that you will be unlucky. If you are lucky
you will receive 100 KSH and if you are unlucky you will lose 100 KSH. In the picture shown, it is
as though you are reaching into the jar and picking up one of the balls without looking. If you get
the red ball you are unlucky and if you get the blue ball you are lucky. The first jar shows your luck
if you complete the task and the second jar shows your luck if you do not complete the task. Please
press the Continue button when you are ready to proceed.
In this game, before the balls for income are drawn and you attempt the task, you and your
partner will be able to communicate to come up with a contract that specifies the promises that you
make to each other for all possible scenarios...
• If both you and your partner are lucky.
• If you are lucky and your partner is unlucky.
• If you are unlucky and your partner is lucky.
• If both you and your partner are unlucky.
and can depend on whether or not you each choose to work...
• If you and your partner both complete the task.
• If you complete the task and your partner does not.
• If you do not compete the task and your partner does.
• If you and your partner both do not complete the task.
You can give as much or as little of your income as you would like - there are no right or wrong
choices. We will record the promise that you and your partner make for each of the 16 scenarios.
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You both must come to an agreement, otherwise no transfers will be made. Then each of you must
enter exactly the same contract into the computer. You cannot both give and receive in the same
promise. For example, if you say that you will receive 10 KSH, then your partner must say she will
give 10 KSH. You will not be allowed to revise the promise after you find out how much income
you and your partner make.
Then, you will be able to attempt the counting task. In this game, your partner will be able to see
whether you completed the task and you will be able to see whether your partner completed the task.
Once promises are made, income will be determined by the computer. Depending on what
income you and your partner receive, transfers will be made based on the promises you and your
partner had chosen. Recall that if this game is chosen for payment, the money you will be paid is the
income after transfers are made. You will be able to see what income you and your partner received,
and will find out what amount of money you received in this game at the end of the session today.
Please press the Continue button when you are ready to proceed.
Please answer the following questions [answered through the touchscreen computer - if the
question is answered incorrectly, the research assistants will go around to individually explain and
participant will need to re-answer the question correctly]:
(If the first game:) Will you be able to see your partner’s income? [YES] Are you allowed to change
the transfer you promised once you see what your partner’s income is? [NO] Will you receive pay-
ment for your decision in this game for sure? [NO] Is it possible for you and your partner to write a
contract neither of you make a transfer to each other? [YES] Can you give or receive transfers from
your partner if you both cannot agree on a contract? [NO]
(Asked for all games:) Will your partner be able to observe whether you choose to complete the
counting task? [YES] Must you choose to complete the counting task? [NO]
Let’s start playing the game! You will be playing the next game with the person sitting in seat
INSERT. Now is the time to discuss with your partner the transfers that you would want to give and
receive. In the next stages you will be asked to write down a contract where you tell us FOR EACH
POSSIBLE SETS OF ACTIONS (we both complete task, I complete task and my partner does not,
my partner completes the task and I do not, we both do not complete the task):
• The transfer seat you give or receive if seat number INSERT receives 100 KSH and seat
number INSERT receives 100 KSH.
• The transfer seat you give or receive if seat number INSERT receives 100 KSH and seat
number INSERT loses 100 KSH.
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• The transfer seat you give or receive if seat number INSERT loses 100 KSH and seat number
INSERT receives 100 KSH.
• The transfer seat you give or receive if seat number INSERT loses 100 KSH and seat number
INSERT loses 100 KSH.
Remember you begin the game with 350 KSH. Therefore, if you receive 100 KSH, you can give up
to 450 KSH and if you lose 100 KSH, you can give up to 250 KSH. When you and your partner are
done with your discussion, please press the Continue button.
[Worksheet 2 handed out. Enumerators ensure that participants always write the participant in
the pair with the lower seat number first on their sheets.]
Did you and your partner agree on a contract? Remember, if you did not agree on a contract,
then no transfers will be made.
(If both participants agree:) Remember you begin the game with 350 KSH. If you are unlucky,
you would have 250 KSH and if you are lucky you would have 450 KSH. Choose how much you
are willing to give to or receive from your partner in each scenario...
• when both you and your partner complete the counting task:
• when seat INSERT completes the task and seat INSERT does not complete the task:
• when seat INSERT does not complete the task and seat INSERT does complete the task:
• with both you and your partner do not complete the counting task:
For each of the above options, the following:
• If seat INSERT is lucky and receives 100 KSH and seat INSERT is also lucky and receives
100 KSH:
• If seat INSERT is lucky and receives 100 KSH and seat INSERT is unlucky and loses 100
KSH:
• If seat INSERT is unlucky and loses 100 KSH and seat INSERT is lucky and receives 100
KSH:
• If seat INSERT is unlucky and loses 100 KSH and seat INSERT is also unlucky and loses
100 KSH:
[For each the participant enters - I (GIVE/RECEIVE) and (AMOUNT) KSH.]
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(If the contracts entered are not the same:) Did you make a mistake in entering the transfers? We
will give you one more chance to correctly enter the amounts you are willing to give to or receive
from your partner.
[Counting Task/Videos Stage] You were (unsuccessful/successful) in completing the counting
task. Your partner was (unsuccessful/successful) in completing the counting task.
EFFORT UNOBSERVABLE GAME
Remember, you and your partner both received 350 KSH at the beginning of the session today. In
this game income is determined both by luck and whether you work hard to complete a task, the
counting task. If you complete the counting task then you will be more likely to get lucky than if
you do not complete the task. Whether you complete the task will not be observed by your partner
and you cannot see whether your partner completes the task. Your partner will be able to see your
income and you will be able to see your partner’s income. Please press the Continue button now.
(If an effort game has not been played:) Now we are going to introduce the counting task to
you. The task consists of grids with 0s and 1s. Your job is to correctly count the number of zeros
for as many grids as possible. There is no penalty for incorrect answers. You will now be given two
minutes to try this task out. We want you to try your best, and so will pay you 2 KSH per correct
answer. Please press the Continue button now to start.
For the game with your partner, the task will last 5 minutes. To complete the task, you need to
correctly count the 0s for at least 45 grids within the 5 minute time period. Remember that if you
complete the task, then you will face more favorable probabilities of good luck.
At any time in the 5 minutes, you can stop attempting the task and can instead relax and watch the
video we have provided by pressing the Video button. You can also switch from watching to the
video back to the counting task by pressing the Attempt Task button. Please press the Continue
button now.
If you complete the task then instead there will be a 3 in 4 chance that you will be lucky and
a 1 in 4 chance that you will be unlucky. If you do not complete the task then you will face less
favorable probabilities that you are lucky. If you choose not to complete the task then instead there
will be a 1 in 4 chance that you will be lucky and a 3 in 4 chance that you will be unlucky. If you
are lucky you will receive 100 KSH and if you are unlucky you will lose 100 KSH. In the picture
shown, it is as though you are reaching into the jar and picking up one of the balls without looking.
If you get the red ball you are unlucky and if you get the blue ball you are lucky. The first jar shows
your luck if you complete the task and the second jar shows your luck if you do not complete the
task. Please press the Continue button when you are ready to proceed.
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In this game, before the balls for income are drawn and you attempt the task, you and your
partner will be able to communicate to come up with a contract that specifies the promises that you
make to each other for all possible scenarios:
• If both you and your partner are lucky.
• If you are lucky and your partner is unlucky.
• If you are unlucky and your partner is lucky.
• If both you and your partner are unlucky.
You can give as much or as little of your income as you would like - there are no right or wrong
choices. We will record the promise that you and your partner make for each of the four scenarios.
You both must come to an agreement, otherwise no transfers will be made. Then each of you must
enter exactly the same contract into the computer. You cannot both give and receive in the same
promise. For example, if you say that you will give 10 KSH, then your partner must say she will
receive 10 KSH. You will not be allowed to revise the promise after you find out how much income
you and your partner make.
Then, you will be able to attempt the counting task. Your partner will not be able to see whether
you completed the task and you will not be able to see whether your partner completed the task.
Your partner can only see whether you were unlucky or lucky and vice versa.
Once promises are made, income will be determined by the computer. Depending on what
income you and your partner receive, transfers will be made based on the promises you and your
partner had chosen. Recall that if this game is chosen for payment, the money you will be paid is the
income after transfers are made. You will be able to see what income you and your partner received,
and will find out what amount of money you received in this game at the end of the session today.
Please press the Continue button when you are ready to proceed.
Please answer the following questions [answered through the touchscreen computer - if the
question is answered incorrectly, the research assistants will go around to individually explain and
participant will need to re-answer the question correctly]:
(If the first game:) Will you be able to see your partner’s income? [YES)] Are you allowed to change
the transfer you promised once you see what your partner’s income is? [NO] Will you receive pay-
ment for your decision in this game for sure? [NO] Is it possible for you and your partner to write a
contract where you make no transfers to each other? [YES] Can you give or receive transfers from
your partner if you both cannot agree on a contract? [NO]
(For all games:) Will your partner be able to observe whether you choose to complete the counting
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task? [NO] Must you choose to complete the counting task? [NO]
Let’s start playing the game! You will be playing the next game with the person sitting in seat
INSERT. Now is the time to discuss with your partner the transfers that you would want to give and
receive. In the next stages you will be asked to write down a contract where you tell us:
• The transfer seat you give or receive if seat number INSERT receives 100 KSH and seat
number INSERT receives 100 KSH.
• The transfer seat you give or receive if seat number INSERT receives 100 KSH and seat
number INSERT loses 100 KSH.
• The transfer seat you give or receive if seat number INSERT loses 100 KSH and seat number
INSERT receives 100 KSH.
• The transfer seat you give or receive if seat number INSERT loses 100 KSH and seat number
INSERT loses 100 KSH.
Remember you begin the game with 350 KSH. Therefore, if you receive 100 KSH, you can give up
to 450 KSH and if you lose 100 KSH, you can give up to 250 KSH. When you and your partner are
done with your discussion, please press the Continue button.
[Worksheet 1 handed out.]
Did you and your partner agree on a contract? Remember, if you did not agree on a contract,
then no transfers will be made.
(If both participants agree:) Remember you begin the game with 350 KSH. If you are unlucky,
you would have 250 KSH and if you are lucky you would have 450 KSH. Choose how much you
are willing to give to or receive from your partner in each scenario:
• If seat INSERT is lucky and receives 100 KSH and seat INSERT is also lucky and receives
100 KSH:
• If seat INSERT is lucky and receives 100 KSH and seat INSERT is unlucky and loses 100
KSH:
• If seat INSERT is unlucky and loses 100 KSH and seat INSERT is lucky and receives 100
KSH:
• If seat INSERT is unlucky and loses 100 KSH and seat INSERT is also unlucky and loses
100 KSH:
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[For each the participant enters - I (GIVE/RECEIVE) and (AMOUNT) KSH.]
(If the contracts entered are not the same:) Did you make a mistake in entering the transfers? We
will give you one more chance to correctly enter the amounts you are willing to give to or receive
from your partner.
[Counting Task/Videos Stage] You were (unsuccessful/successful) in completing the counting
task. Your partner was (unsuccessful/successful) in completing the counting task.
ANONYMOUS DICTATOR GAME
You will not know who is your partner in this game - thus your choices will be secret and no one
will know what you have chosen. In this game you do not know whether you are the OFFERER or
the RECEIVER. If you are the OFFERER, then you have been given 100 KSH and your partner has
been given no money. You can choose to keep all the money for yourself, or you can choose to give
some or all of the money to your partner. Your partner will receive the money you have given, and
you will receive whatever money you have kept for yourself. Your partner will not know that you
have given them the money. Your partner will not have the opportunity to give you money since he
or she was not given any money in this game. The choices in this game will be paid for sure. This
is in addition to the payment you will receive for the previous games played. If you are chosen to
be the OFFERER, your partner will receive what you have chosen. If you are the RECEIVER you
will receive what your partner has chosen.
Please answer the following questions [answered through the touchscreen computer - if the
question is answered incorrectly, the research assistants will go around to explain and subjects will
need to re-answer the question correctly]: Will your partner know who you are in this game? [NO]
If you are the OFFERER, will your partner be able to give you money in this game? [NO] Will
payment be made for the decisions in this game for sure? [YES]
Let’s start playing the game! Please press the Continue button now.
If you are the OFFERER, how much are you willing to give to your partner?
RISK AVERSION
Next you will be individually making decisions over two choices. You will be paid based on your
decision for sure. This is in addition to the payment you will receive for the previous games. 100
credits corresponds to 1 KSH in this game.
Suppose that you are considering two types of goods, good A and good B, to sell in the market.
We are going to ask you which of these two goods you would prefer to sell. How do these two
goods differ? Let’s focus on the our first choice. With good A if you are lucky you will get 1000 in
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income each week. If you are unlucky you will get 800 in income each week. A ball at random will
be drawn from the jar depicted. In the jar for good A, if the red ball is chosen you will get 1000;
however if the blue ball is chosen you will get 800.
With good B if you are lucky you will get 2000 in income each week. If you are unlucky you will
get 100 in income each week. In the urn for good B, if the green ball is chosen you will get 2000;
however if the orange ball is chosen you will get 100.
Please press the Continue button now.
Which good would you prefer to sell?
<<Survey (see online appendix) >>
Outcomes Announced
In the game with only luck:
• You were <<lucky/unlucky>>! Your income is <<100/-100>> KSH.
• Your partner was <<lucky/unlucky>>! Your partner’s income is<<100/-100>> KSH.
• Your transfer <<to/from>> your partner in this round is <<inserted>> KSH.
• Your income at the end of this game is <<inserted>> KSH.
In the game with observable completion of the counting task:
• You were <<lucky/unlucky>>! Your income is <<100/-100>> KSH.
• Your partner was <<lucky/unlucky>>! Your partner’s income is<<100/-100>> KSH.
• Your transfer <<to/from>> your partner in this round is <<inserted>> KSH.
• Your income at the end of this game is <<inserted>> KSH.
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In the game with completion of the counting task not observable:
• You were <<lucky/unlucky>>! Your income is <<100/-100>> KSH.
• Your partner was <<lucky/unlucky>>! Your partner’s income is<<100/-100>> KSH.
• Your transfer <<to/from>> your partner in this round is <<inserted>> KSH.
• Your income at the end of this game is <<inserted>> KSH.
Your final payment is <<inserted>> KSH.
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APPENDIX B
Example of the Worksheets
Note: Worksheet 1 is used for the Risk Only and Unobservable Effort Games, while Worksheet 2
is used for the Observable Effort Game. During contract negotiation, the laboratory assistants went
around the room to aid participants in filling the worksheets in order to ensure that participants could





Additional Tables and Figures for Chapter 1
Table C.1: Sessions Summary
Session Date Time of Day Participants Game Order
1 4/15/15 Afternoon 20 B-C-A
2 4/16/15 Late Morning 20 B-A-C
3 4/17/15 Morning 20 B-A-C
4 4/17/15 Late Morning 16 C-A-B
5 4/18/15 Morning 18 B-A-C
6 4/22/15 Morning 18 A-C-B
7 4/22/15 Late Morning 16 C-B-A
8 4/23/15 Morning 14 A-B-C
9 4/23/15 Late Morning 16 A-C-B
10 4/24/15 Morning 20 C-B-A
11 4/24/15 Late Morning 14 A-B-C
12 4/25/15 Morning 18 B-C-A
13 4/25/15 Late Morning 12 B-A-C
14 4/27/15 Late Morning 16 C-A-B
15 4/28/15 Afternoon 20 A-B-C
16 6/3/15 Morning 14 B-C-A
17 6/3/15 Afternoon 14 B-A-C
18 6/4/15 Morning 18 C-A-B
19 6/4/15 Afternoon 20 A-B-C
20 6/8/15 Morning 14 A-C-B
21 6/8/15 Afternoon 18 B-A-C
22 6/9/15 Morning 10 C-B-A
23 6/10/15 Morning 20 C-A-B
24 6/10/15 Afternoon 20 B-C-A
25 6/11/15 Afternoon 20 C-B-A
Game A: Risk Only Game, Game B: Observable Effort Game, Game
C: Unobservable Effort Game.
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Table C.2: Results with All Games (with Partner Fixed Effects)
Any Transfers Promised Transfers Promised
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Same Partner Partner All Same Partner Partner
VE Rel Rel VE Rel Rel
Group Two Way Group Two Way
Unobservable Effort Game (α1) −0.047∗∗ −0.063∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.906 1.138 −3.095 −2.266
[0.022] [0.033] [0.027] [0.024] [1.924] [3.056] [2.446] [2.205]
Risk Only Game −0.028 −0.029 −0.001 −0.018 0.291 −1.337 −1.669 −1.205
[0.022] [0.034] [0.033] [0.026] [1.924] [3.126] [2.952] [2.373]
Relationship (α2) 0.118∗∗ 0.096 0.025 1.403 −2.238 3.883
[0.058] [0.064] [0.072] [5.116] [5.641] [6.406]
Relationship * Unobs Effort Game (α3) 0.036 0.087 0.282∗∗∗ −3.942 8.563 11.840
[0.049] [0.065] [0.085] [4.399] [5.717] [7.581]
Relationship * Risk Only Game 0.009 −0.101 −0.055 3.422 5.216 5.236
[0.052] [0.072] [0.084] [4.645] [6.332] [7.444]
Coefficient: α2 + α3 0.153∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ −2.539 6.325 15.723∗∗∗
Std. Dev.: α2 + α3 [0.058] [0.057] [0.067] [5.104] [4.957] [5.918]
Coefficient: α1 + α3 −0.027 0.021 0.202∗∗∗ −2.804 5.468 9.573
Std. Dev.: α1 + α3 [0.032] [0.053] [0.077] [2.798] [4.631] [6.774]
Obs Game & No Relationship Mean 0.685 0.692 0.685 0.696 25.800 22.127 27.525 27.003
Obs Game & No Relationship Std. Dev. [0.465] [0.463] [0.465] [0.461] [35.189] [27.629] [35.326] [35.382]
Observations 1258 1258 1258 1258 1278 1278 1278 1278
R-squared 0.45 0.454 0.454 0.460 0.516 0.523 0.527 0.540
Notes: Sample data is for all 3 risk sharing games, 426 individuals. These regressions include individual fixed effects and partner fixed effects. Standard
errors are in brackets. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Same VE Group indicates whether a participant speaks the same language and lives in the
same village within Kibera as their partner (mean 0.510). Partner Rel indicates whether a participant claims to know their partner outside the experiment
(mean of 0.314). Partner Rel Two Way indicates whether a participant claims to know their partner outside the experiment and their partner claims to
know them outside the experiment (mean of 0.166).
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APPENDIX D
Additional Tables and Figures for Chapter 2
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Table D.1: Sessions Summary
Session Date Time of Day Participants Game Order
1 3/20/15 Afternoon 10 C-B-A
2 3/23/15 Morning 20 A-B-C
3 3/23/15 Afternoon 16 A-C-B
4 3/25/15 Morning 12 B-A-C
5 3/25/15 Afternoon 10 B-C-A
6 3/27/15 Morning 14 C-A-B
7 3/27/15 Afternoon 18 B-C-A
8 3/30/15 Late Morning 20 A-C-B
9 3/30/15 Afternoon 18 C-A-B
10 3/31/15 Late Morning 14 C-B-A
11 3/31/15 Afternoon 16 A-B-C
12 4/7/15 Afternoon 20 B-A-C
13 4/9/15 Morning 18 C-B-A
14 4/9/15 Late Morning 20 C-A-B
15 4/10/15 Morning 14 A-B-C
16 4/13/15 Afternoon 10 A-C-B
17 4/15/15 Afternoon 20 B-C-A
18 4/16/15 Late Morning 20 B-A-C
19 4/17/15 Morning 20 B-A-C
20 4/17/15 Late Morning 16 C-A-B
21 4/18/15 Morning 18 B-A-C
22 4/22/15 Morning 18 A-C-B
23 4/22/15 Late Morning 16 C-B-A
24 4/23/15 Morning 14 A-B-C
25 4/23/15 Late Morning 16 A-C-B
26 4/24/15 Morning 20 C-B-A
27 4/24/15 Late Morning 14 A-B-C
28 4/25/15 Morning 18 B-C-A
29 4/25/15 Late Morning 12 B-A-C
30 4/27/15 Late Morning 16 C-A-B
31 4/28/15 Afternoon 20 A-B-C
32 6/3/15 Morning 14 B-C-A
33 6/3/15 Afternoon 14 B-A-C
34 6/4/15 Morning 18 C-A-B
35 6/4/15 Afternoon 20 A-B-C
36 6/8/15 Morning 14 A-C-B
37 6/8/15 Afternoon 18 B-A-C
38 6/9/15 Morning 10 C-B-A
39 6/10/15 Morning 20 C-A-B
40 6/10/15 Afternoon 20 B-C-A
41 6/11/15 Afternoon 20 C-B-A




Additional Tables and Figures for Chapter 3
Figure E.1: Distribution of Days in the Last Four Weeks that the Head of Household
Couldn’t Do Daily Activities Due to Health Reasons
I omit observations reporting zero days in the past four week that the head of household could not do daily
activities due to health reasons for expositional clarity.
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Figure E.2: Distribution of the Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) Index
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